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The use of space today is largely unregulated. Any laws that may be codified are
contained within the text of a few international treaties, or in a limited sense in the national
policies of a given country. These treaties, all written over a span of less than a decade
(1967 to 1975), were largely the result of the race to space between the United States and
the Soviet Union. These treaties have not been modified over the ensuing years, and the
fact that they were written at all can be looked upon as being remarkable itself.
This paper outlines the issues that have appeared and shaped the world's approach
to activities in space. Some of these issues are poised to shape future operations in space.
Therefore, any student studying activities involving the use of space should have a basic
understanding of their political and legal foundation. A discussion concerning international
treaties and agreements as they pertain to space use is informative. Additionally, by
viewing national policies, their evolution, applicability, and their relationship within the
international space forum is important. This author believes that the basic understanding
gained through the study of these space laws and policies gives any student an appreciation
for the regulatory side of space programs. These regulations and laws could prove to be
more daunting than any search for a technical solution of a future space problem. Such
topics are the delimitation and control of space, space debris, the interpretation of the ABM
Treaty, and space warfare.
Chapter II covers the topic of the delimitation and control of space. It traces the
establishment of sovereignty over national airspace and builds up to the differing
delimitation theories as they were applied to outer space. In some instances, a composite
picture is presented as many theories were nearly identical, sometimes differing only in the
proposed height limits. In most cases, an intimate depth of discussion was not seen as
necessary nor desired in order to present a clear picture of this evolution of man's desire to
apply boundaries to everything he can touch. Much of the material was derived from
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Congressional hearings, speeches, and published papers dating back to the beginning of
the 1950s.
Chapter III details in depth the problem which space debris poses. A detailed
presentation of the sources and types of debris, and the uncertainty involved in cataloging
the magnitude of the problem was viewed as pivotal in order to gain an understanding of
why action is needed on the part of spacefaring nations. Some of the current tracking
methods used are discussed, as are the factors affecting debris once it has been created.
Finally, and most importantly, a discussion is provided of the various treaties and U.S.
governmental policies which detail the current debris control regime and which attempt to
provide a means to assign responsibility for the debris created.
Chapter IV briefly discusses several topics that show the formulation of
international actions regarding space and reaction to U.S. policies. These topics tend to
show a pattern of U.S. behavior concerning the use of space or issues involving space
applications.
Almost every topic discussed is followed up with concluding remarks. In many
instances, the conclusion contains the author's opinion or beliefs about the issue. Every
chapter was written so that it may stand on its own; it is not necessary to read them in the
order written. In all cases, just the basic information for the issue is presented so that the
reader understands the pertinent facts involved.
II. DELIMITATION AND CONTROL OF SPACE
A. INTRODUCTION
Long before man successfully launched rockets into the upper reaches of the
atmosphere, the question of where exactly space "started" had been addressed in academic
and legal circles throughout the world. As a matter of course, the additional question of
sovereignty in outer space came to be vigorously debated and was thrust to the forefront
with the launching of Sputnik by the Soviet Union on 4 October, 1957. Soviet legal
experts were quick to point out that no violation of foreign air space had occurred since
Sputnik did not pass over other countries; rather, countries passed under Sputnik as the
earth rotated |Legal Problems of Space Exploration - A Symposium, 1961 J.
On 14 May, 1958, in a speech before the Special Senate Committee on Space and
Astronautics, Loftus Becker, a legal adviser to the State Department, set the tone the United
States would take on the sovereignty of airspace. As he had been advised that the extent of
the atmosphere was approximately 10,000 miles above the earth's surface, he stated [Legal
Problems of Space Exploration - A Symposium, 1961]:
...that it would be perfectly rational for us to maintain that.. .the sovereignty of the United
States extends 10,000 miles from the surface of the earth. At any rate, that type of
definition would afford us enough elbow room for discussion.
The question of delimitation and sovereignty of outer space are interrelated
questions. They stem from this preoccupation of national decision-makers to fix state
boundaries, within which their governments may exercise exclusive rights. This is
apparent in the many air and sea legal rules observed by nations around the world today,
and is best embodied in Adlai E. Stevenson's statement in 1962 that men are conditioned to
think "in terms of states. ..defined by finite areas expressed in finite measurements. ..And
especially. ..(men) are conditioned to think in terms of national sovereignties." fWhite,
1970]
With remarkable foresight, Henry Cabot Lodge, in a statement to the United
Nations General Assembly on 13 November, 1958 regarding the legal aspects of outer
space, put forth the following idea [White, 1970):
Nations have had so far only the most limited and tentative experience with space
exploration, and there is very little knowledge of it. We need the information which
comes from experience in order to get some idea of the practical problems man's entry
into space will create. Such knowledge is a prerequisite to definitive legal rules for outer
space. As this knowledge is acquired, the law of outer space will develop gradually and as
actual situations and concrete problems call for legal answers.
Similarly, it is important to view some of the early attempts to define air space, as
these early arguments and agreements are the genesis of man's search to define the limits of
outer space.
B. THE EARLY 1900s
From the advent of balloon flight in the late 1700s to the first flight of the aeroplane
in 1903, governments had looked at ways to control the air space over their countries
through the use of regulations, and by the application of force if necessary. The chief
threat posed by such "illegal" overflights were acts of espionage, namely
photoreconnaisance. During this time there were largely two major theories regarding the
boundaries of airspace. The first was the "freedom of the air" and the second was one of
exclusive sovereignty.
1 . Freedom of the Air
In 1906, the French delegate to the Institute of International Law meeting in Ghent
put forth a theory (first proposed in 1902) that the air space should be open to aircraft of all
nations, with the restriction that individual states could take suitable measures in the interest
of their own security. This theory actually divided the air into three zones : a lower zone, up
to 330 meters (later modified to 1500 meters) which could be used for the construction of
buildings and where flight would be prohibited to other states; the zone above 5000 meters
which could not be reached by aircraft; and the zone in-between would be open to free
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flight. It is interesting to note that the height of the Eiffel Tower is approximately 330
meters. [Space Law - A Symposium, 1958]
Later, at an Institute meeting in Madrid in 191 1, this freedom of the air principle
was adopted. The Institute stated that (Space Law - A Symposium, 1958]
...international aerial circulation is free, saving the right of subjacent states to take certain
measures, to be determined, to insure their own security and that of the persons and
property of their inhabitants.
Meanwhile, many other governments took a vastly different view upon the air space over
their property.
2 . Absolute Sovereignty
The absolute sovereignty theory held that the air space over the territory and
territorial waters was the sovereign right of the subjacent nation and could not be restricted
by any easement-like "right of transit flight" [Legal Problems of Space Exploration - A
Symposium, 1961 ].
In 1911, in reaction to a growing concern of control of the air space over their
nation, the British Parliament passed the Aerial Navigation Act which allowed the Secretary
of State to prohibit flight over such areas as may be prescribed in the order. This was done
under the auspices of protecting the public, and was really enacted in order to prevent any
accident during the Coronation procession that year.
This act was followed up with the Act of 1913, a clear assertion of national
sovereignty in air space. It allowed the Secretary of State to prohibit aerial flight for a
number of purposes; the chief purpose was for the "defense or safety of the realm" and that
the prescribed areas "may include the whole or any part of the coastline of the United
Kingdom and the territorial waters adjacent thereto". Aircraft which failed to comply could
be fired upon. [Johnson, 1965]
Similarly, in November of 1912, the Russian Cabinet had authorized the Minister
of War to prohibit aerial flight over the western borders of Russia. Again, armed force was
authorized to enforce this restriction.
Accordingly, in order to resolve these differing opinions on air space sovereignty,
the International Law Association met in Madrid in 1913 and put forth the following
resolutions 1 Space Law - A Symposium, 1958):
1. It is the right of every State to enact such prohibitions, restrictions, and regulations as
it may think proper in regard to the passage of aircraft through the air space above its
territories and territorial waters.
2. Subject to this right of subjacent States, liberty of passage of aircraft ought to be
accorded freely to the aircraft of every nation.
It should be noted that both of the Madrid meetings were not official diplomatic
conferences. Additionally, no U.S. representative participated in any of the discussions,
though U .S. citizens were members of both organizations.
C. THE PARIS CONVENTION OF 1919
During World War I, countries declared their air boundaries closed, and any
belligerent aircraft caught flying over neutral territory were forced to land and the crews
interned. World War I was to prove the strategic importance of aircraft; there was now
little question that the national security of a country was greatly dependent upon the
domination of its air space. This importance was best exemplified by Great Britain's
entrance into the war in 1914 with just 12 aircraft. By November 1918, it had expanded to
22,000 aircraft with some able to carry 5-ton bombs more than two hundred miles. The
speed and mobility of that day's aircraft forever doomed the theory of freedom of the air;
national security and defense dominated government opinions.
Thus, from the deliberations of the Paris Peace Conference, an Allied aeronautical
commission was organized in order to draft a set of aerial navigation rules. From this
Convention came the Regulation of Aerial Navigation, signed on 13 October, 1919. Article
1 declared that "every Power has the complete and exclusive sovereignty over the air space
above its territory". Article 2 of the Regulation also provided for the "freedom of innocent
passage above its territory to the aircraft of the other contracting States..." and Article 15
allowed that "the establishment of international airways shall be subject to the consent of
the States flown over". The Paris Convention was ratified or adhered to by thirty-four
nations. It was signed on behalf of the United States on 31 May, 1920 but was never
ratified by the U.S. government. [Space Law - A Symposium, 1958 1 Sovereignty of a
State's airspace was now an accepted standard in international law.
D. THE CHICAGO CONVENTION OF 1944
Before the end of World War II, it was apparent to governments around the world
that a better foundation for the establishment of a set of civil aviation standards would be
needed after the war. The performance which aircraft could now achieve easily proved the
need for a more specific set of international rules.
Therefore, in 1944, fifty-two governments attended a conference in Chicago in
order to achieve a world-wide consensus for a post-war order in civil aviation
transportation; the numerous regional bilateral and multilateral agreements made between
the two World Wars would no longer suffice in this new age. In doing so, the Convention
clearly recognized the future economic potential that civil aviation would play in post-war
world affairs. Many world leaders realized that a failure in this endeavor could burden
many countries, especially those without seacoasts.
The work of this Convention resulted in the creation of the Constitution of the
International Civil Aviation Organization (ICAO) which came into force on 4 April, 1947.
Like the 1919 Convention before it, Article 1 of the 1944 Convention reaffirmed the
principle that "the contracting States recognize that every State has complete and exclusive
sovereignty of the airspace above its territory." Territory as defined includes the adjacent
land and territorial waters. As an additional point, Article 3 states 'The Convention shall be
applicable only to civil aircraft..." |Johnson, 19651.
The Convention also defined five so-called freedoms of the air. The first two
freedoms are set forth in the International Air Services Transit Agreement: the privilege of
flying across a country non-stop; and of flying across with a stop for technical purposes
only. These are also known as transit rights. The other three freedoms are known as
traffic rights because they refer to passengers, mail, and cargo carried on commercial
flights; international consensus of these traffic rights was never reached due to the
numerous and conflicting economic implications involved. Currently, these traffic rights
are generally concluded through bilateral and multilateral international agreements. Today,
most nations of the world have ratified or adhere to this Convention.
E. OUTER SPACE
As the 1950s approached, a new problem was developing which would create even
more debate than was seen at the two previous Conventions. The question now was not
one of air space sovereignty, but of how high does this sovereignty extend. Some claimed
it extended ad infinitum, but this was clearly viewed as being unrealistic.
Therefore, in order to define outer space, an exact definition of the term "air space"
was needed. To arrive at such a definition, many jurists turned to the task of defining
where air space stopped. By doing so, it would follow that the start of outer space would
then be self-evident.
1 . Spatial Approach
a. Scientific Application
The literal interpretation of "air space" or "atmospheric space" is that portion
of space which is right above the earth and is filled with air. However, where this air
ceases to be of any real or measurable importance is the central issue in the determination of
an upper boundary. Space up to an altitude of approximately 50 km contains about 99.9%
of the whole atmospheric substance ILegal Problems of Space Exploration - A
Symposium, 1961 J. The general consensus among many authors of the 1950-1960s
concerning the various atmospheric layers consisted of the following:
troposphere: sea level to approximately 10 km (6 miles)
stratosphere: approximately 10 km - 40 km
ionosphere: approximately 40 km - 375 km
exosphere: approximately 375 km - 20,000 km or more.
Though this list is not all inclusive, the general idea of breaking down the atmosphere into
component parts is made. Of these layers, some believe the "atmosphere" consists of the
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troposphere and the stratosphere, while many scientists consider the ionosphere to be the
upper boundary of the atmosphere. In addition, there are many other factors one could
consider in order to determine this upper boundary, among them being the height at which
meteors become luminous (~300 km) and the height of the observable rays of the aurora
borealis (-1100 km). | Matte, 1969|
b . Physiological Effects
Another way to view the spatial approach is to simply look at the impact the
environment exhibits upon the human body. Specifically, what are the critical altitude(s)
where the absence of oxygen will adversely impact the functional ability of a human?
In general, lack of oxygen begins at 10,000 ft. (3,000 m). At
approximately 18,000 ft. (5,500 m), the air pressure is half that at sea level. Loss of
consciousness can occur between 25,000 - 30,000 ft. (7,500 - 9,000 m). However, a man
breathing pure oxygen (non-pressurized) will continue to function normally until about
34,000 ft. (10,000 m); at this altitude, the oxygen pressure in the bloodstream is the same
as that at sea level. At 52,000 ft. (15,800 m), a man will lose consciousness in
approximately 15 seconds as the partial pressure of oxygen in his lungs is zero; the lungs
contain only water vapor and carbon dioxide. At 63,000 ft. (19,200 m), the atmospheric
pressure equals the vapor pressure of water at body temperature (37°C). Water vapor is
now the only gas present in the lungs, causing the blood to boil. [Encyclopedia Britannica,
1974]
Therefore, because these widely disparate data points and views all lead to different
opinions, it was apparent that any attempt to define the upper boundary of air space through
scientific discussion and application would not lead to an international agreement.
2. Functional Approach
The inability to fix the altitude limits of national sovereignty based on scientific or
technical criteria was proof to many that any division should be based upon the activity
involved, i.e., it would be adequate to strictly distinguish between flights of space and
aircraft |Zhukov, 1984].
a. Navigable Airspace
This particular Junctional approach was based upon the belief that the
division should be viewed as that airspace which was navigable and that which was not. It
seemed to be the perfect way to differentiate between air space and outer space. Relying
upon such a premise, however, required a definition of navigable airspace.
Consequently, it seemed logical to look to established law in order to derive
some legitimacy needed for such a discussion. Of course, the law looked at was the 1944
Chicago Convention. As stated previously, Article 1 of the Convention recognized the
complete and exclusive sovereignty of the air space above a State's territory. But the
Chicago Convention never defines the term "air space" or any altitude limit of a State's
sovereignty, nor has it ever been defined elsewhere in international law.
It was generally believed that the delimitation argument could end if the
definition agreed with an opinion such as the one declared by the International Law
Association in 1958; this opinion stated that "the term airspace used in Article 1 of the
Chicago Convention of 7 December, 1944, is in its plain meaning synonymous with
atmospheric airspace." [Matte, 1969J
This lack of an explicit definition of air space was an insurmountable
hurdle, one that would render the Convention useless in the establishment of an upper
boundary. Problems of this nature would be solved in the future by the Vienna Convention
on the Law of Treaties, which entered into force on 27 January, 1980. Article 31 of this
document states in part that "A treaty shall be interpreted in good faith in accordance with
the ordinary meaning to be given to the terms of the treaty in their context and in light of its
object and purpose." |Vienna Convention, 1980]
However, it was to be the close relationship between aircraft and air space
from which the legitimacy of this functional approach evolved.
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Territorial air space, as defined in the 1944 Convention, would be called
navigable air space. Further, this air space extended upward to such heights where aircraft
could be operated using only gaseous air for aerodynamic lift to maintain flight. [Matte,
1969| The basis for this was Annex 7 to the Chicago Convention which provides for the
definition of an aircraft as "Any machine that can derive support in the atmosphere from the
reactions of the air" [Matte, 1969J. This approach seemed to be upheld in principle by a
statement made by the Director of the Legal Department of the United Nations in 1958. He
stated that "there is reasonably broad consensus of expert opinion that the terrestrial air
space, as mentioned in the Paris and Chicago Conventions, does not extend outside the
limits of the atmosphere contributing to the lift or support of aircraft." [Matte, 1969]
It is interesting to note that the Soviet view for much of the 1960s through at
least the mid-1980s held that this functional approach failed to take into account any
prospect of further significant scientific and technical advances in air and space flying
machines. This showed their belief of a natural progression that would result in the
blurring between aeronautics and astronautics. [Zhukov, 1969, 19841
In view of the above, on 4 October, 1960, a Soviet-American agreement
was reached at the International Aeronautical Federation. It qualified as "spacecrafT any
craft exceeding 62 miles (100km) in altitude [Matte, 1969].
b. Non-navigable Airspace
As time progressed, it appeared that many jurists agreed that any altitudinal
limit of a State's sovereignty should be established higher than the ceiling of normal aircraft
flight [Zhukov, 1969]. This perspective can be seen if the delimitation problem is
approached by looking at the flight results of the United States' X-15.
The X-15 was a rocket-driven winged machine which used aerodynamic lift
when available and used a different system of controls when aerodynamic lift was lost. As
such, it was sort of a hybrid aircraft-spacecraft. By 1963 it had attained an altitude of 47
miles (70 km) and would ultimately reach 60 miles. Since the ceiling of usual flights of
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aircraft was approximately 25 miles (40km), many felt that the air space should possibly
extend to the point where any aerodynamic lift was available, or possibly even to the point
where the atmosphere was sufficiently dense to prevent a satellite's orbit. This led to the
suggestion that 50 miles (80 km) would be a practical boundary for the following reasons
| Matte, 1969]:
1. It is well above the altitude we can generate aerodynamic lift to control a vehicle.
2. Even at speeds approaching satellite velocities, much of a vehicle's capabilities are
received from dynamic lift compared to aerodynamic lift.
3. At 50 miles altitude the density is such a small fraction of 1 percent of the atmosphere
that it should be acceptable to consider that all useful qualities of the atmosphere are
below that level.
One could now rightfully claim that the path toward a functional approach for space
delimitation appears to have again turned into an arbitrary and controversial road, away
from classifying flight based upon the type of activity involved. Perhaps the functional
approach in its purist form already exists as embodied in Article I of the 1967 Outer Space
Treaty: "Outer space, including the moon and other celestial bodies, shall be free for
exploration and use by all States without discrimination of any kind..." Moreover, it
would appear that any attempt to define where space begins will simply be based upon the
physical and scientific limitations imposed by present technology.
3 . Zone Approach
a. Law of the Sea
The arguments for freedom of the seas date back to the Roman era. This
idea also saw foundation in 1580 when Queen Elizabeth rejected a Spanish protest of Sir
Francis Drake's "violation" of Spanish sovereignty by having sailed in the Pacific without
Spanish permission. Queen Elizabeth declared that vessels of all nations were entitled to
use the ocean. \Space Law - A Symposium, 1958)
However, total freedom on the seas did not come without qualification.
Most nations did believe in some sort of buffer area along their coasts as a measure to blunt
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possible foreign intrusion. Further, from the time George Washington was President until
about 1960, the United States had advocated the "three-mile rule" as the limit of a State's
sovereignty of territorial waters. The basis of this "three-mile" limit was predicated upon
an age old rule (c. 1645) of what was considered to be the utmost range of a cannon ball.
This customary observance over time became accepted by most nations of the world as
international law.
By the early 1900s, many parallels had been drawn between the law of the
sea and that of the air space. Since sovereignty of the airspace had been acknowledged
internationally by the 1919 Convention, many argued for the analogous application of sea
law to provide the foundation of air space law. Chiefly, since the time-honored right of
innocent passage of a ship through territorial waters was uncontested in international law,
proponents believed a foreign aircraft should receive similar rights through national
airspace.
In 1958 the United Nations Convention on the Territorial Sea, commonly
known as the "Law of the Sea", formally recognized the right of innocent passage of ships
through territorial waters. Passage was deemed innocent as long as "it is not prejudiced to
the peace, good order, or security of the coastal State". It provided for the protection of a
State's security in the ability of that State to suspend innocent passage after due publication
and without discrimination among foreign ships [Space Law - A Symposium, 1958].
However, it wasn't until 1965 that the generally recognized three-mile claim was
supplanted by a twelve-mile claim among a majority of the Law of the Sea conferees; this
twelve-mile claim was finally established as international law in December, 1982
| Robertson, 1992].
Most notable in the 1958 Law of the Sea Convention was the recognition
and universal acceptance of the establishment of a contiguous zone extending not more than
12 nm from the baseline from which the breadth of the territorial sea was measured
| Robertson, 1992]. Inside this contiguous zone, a coastal State could exercise the control
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necessary to prevent infringement of its fiscal, immigration, customs, or sanitary
regulations within its territory or territorial waters. This contiguous zone, now firmly
established in international law, was extended to twenty-four nm from a State's baseline by
the 1982 Law of the Sea Convention. Further, it seemed to help give rise to an approach
for airspace division borrowing upon the same principle.
b . Contiguous Zone
In the early 1960s, a prominent United States air law professor put forth a
theory of zones in order to define airspace. The theory had three zones: (1) the airspace
immediately over a State, within which the State would exercise complete and exclusive
sovereignty; (2) an intermediate area within which free passage should be granted for
peaceful purposes; and (3) an unlimited outer area of free space. [Matte, 1969]
This theory had two important considerations:
(1) That the limit of national sovereignty, complete and exclusive, should
be reasonably low, in order to facilitate the exploration of space;
(2) That the subjacent States would have a legitimate interest in exercising
certain control powers in the contiguous zone, for reasons of conservation. [Space Law - A
Symposium, 1958]
In the first zone, or territorial air space, there would not be the right of
innocent passage as found in maritime law. Further defined, this zone would consist of
that air space which was navigable. The second zone would consist of the non-navigable
air space, similar to the contiguous zone in maritime law. [Space Law - A Symposium,
1958]
A zone theory looked promising if the definition of "air space" was
internationally accepted as that air space which is navigable by aircraft. Additionally, there
was much disagreement over how many zones there should be. Some went so far as to
propose four, while a majority believed there should be two, with the contiguous zone
being discarded. The two zone theory essentially recognized State sovereignty in the
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navigable air space, since it was argued that the basis for this concept was already rooted in
the 1944 Convention. Further, it gave free status to the zone beyond, or space.
4 . Other Theories
Many other theories have attempted to define an appropriate boundary between air
space and outer space without taking on the burden of defining either. A few are discussed
below.
a. Kepler's Laws
A scientist named von Karman expressed an idea which stated a definite
altitude to describe the primary jurisdictional line between air space and outer space. This
altitude defined the limit at which aerodynamic displacement ceases and the force of the
Kepler laws begin. This division was called the Karman line and was originally set at 85
km and was later changed to 100 km in the early 1960s. This change was chiefly brought
about because of the experimental flight results of the United State's X-15 aircraft. [Matte,
1969]
Even the proponents of the Karman line saw that this theoretical limit line of
air space navigation could be significantly changed given the development of improved
cooling techniques and more heat resistant materials and then applied to aircraft design.
b . Earth 's Grav ity
One author in 1953 thought the best way to scientifically describe the
boundary between air and space was to set it "where the mathematical value of the field of
the earth's gravitation is nil, or in other words "where weight ceases its manifestations"
(Matte, 1969]. Still others, in 1955, believed in this same theory but really for functional
purposes. They reasoned that the ever increasing altitudes attained by aircraft necessitated
the need to fix in the air where the national sovereignty of States could not be violated.
Therefore, they stated that using "the criteria based on the strength of the earth's gravity, as
an indication of sovereignty, is the most objective, the most rational and the surest" [Matte,
19691.
15
However, these gravitational theories are imprecise at best as they cannot
account for the variance of the field due to the earth's oblateness, rotational effects, etc.
Therefore, because of this burden of defining exactly where gravity ceases and the
impractical altitudes which it implies renders this theory essentially useless.
c . Orbit
This theory relates to the lowest point of a satellite's orbit, or perigee.
Simply stated, the theoretical line of demarcation of a State's sovereignty would lie at the
perigee of the lowest flying satellite of any State. Basing outer space delimitation upon
such an altitude seemed promising to many. This theory came to be favored by Soviet
jurists.
The premise for this theory was simple. By the late 1960s, hundreds of
satellites and spacecraft had been launched into orbit. Generally, the perigee of most had
approached no closer than 160 km. Further, these flights did not evoke any protests from
the States over whose territories they passed. However, the Soviets at this time believed it
was still too early to conclude that an international convention was being formed or had
been formed on basing an altitude limit consistent with perigee. They saw that the absence
of protests from any State against such satellite launchings and orbits could be interpreted
as implied consent to the principle of freedom of outer space for peaceful activities in
general, but not as recognition of the freedom of access to outer space at a certain altitude.
However, this Soviet viewpoint was to gradually change. [Zhukov, 1969J
In 1979, the Soviet delegation to the 22nd session of the United Nations
Committee on the Peaceful Uses of Outer Space (COPUOS) submitted a working paper on
the delimitation of air space and outer space. It contained the following points (Zhukov,
1984J:
1. The region above 100/1 10 km altitude from the sea level of the Earth is outer space.
2. The boundary between air space and outer space shall be subject to agreement among
States and shall subsequently be established by a treaty at an altitude not exceeding
100/1 10 km above sea level.
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3. Space objects of States shall retain the right to fly over the territory of other States at
an altitude lower than 100 (1 10) km above sea level for the purpose of reaching orbit or
returning to Earth in the territory of the launching State.
This Soviet delimitation proposal was highly flexible in its content, as it did
not rule out the delimitation of outer space below 1 10 km; a statement made by the United
States representative to the Committee pointed out that in 1974 a U.S. satellite had a 96 km
perigee.
It is interesting to note that in 1976, a working paper entitled "Study on the
Altitudes of Artificial Earth Satellites" was prepared by the United Nations Committee on
Space Research (COSPAR) |Zhukov, 1984J. This paper gave detailed characteristics of
low perigee satellites and estimated that the lowest altitude at which a satellite could survive
without burning in the atmosphere was 90 km. Further, a Czech scientist working as the
director for the United Nations Secretariat space section stated the following [Zhukov,
1984]:
The criterion of the lowest perigees of Earth satellites has the advantage that it is based
primarily on physical concepts, which are invariable. It depends on technological
progress to a very slight degree. In principle it would be possible to construct a special-
purpose artificial satellite which would survive below 90 km or at any height, for that
matter. There would however, be no gain in any application of such a satellite and its
cost would be out of proportion because an extreme mass-to area ratio can be achieved
only by using heavy materials such as lead, gold, uranium, or platinum in large
quantities.
Throughout the 1970s, the idea of using this 90 km or 100/1 10 km altitude
as the division air and space was viewed as the most realistic method for sovereignty
limitation. The United States, however, still believes that the issue should be solved on a
functional basis.
To date, there has been no agreement reached and little further effort in
obtaining an international agreement based upon the above principles.
F. CONCLUSION
In spite of the considerable time and effort spent to determine a space boundary, it
still remains elusive. It may be akin to the search for Xanadu. But perhaps those who
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believe the search is meaningless are correct. It is probable that this quest has been nothing
more than an attempt to keep security of the State intact. However, any State can be
threatened from much higher altitudes than the 50, 80 or even 100 km proposed
delimitation altitudes. Further, even the establishment of such a boundary for the purposes
of State sovereignty would not prohibit another State the right to take steps to safeguard its
security against hostile actions above that limit. This right to maintain and defend a State's
interests in space exists in accordance with Articles III and IX of the Outer Space Treaty
[Zhukov, 1984).
It is difficult to speak of any physical border between the air space of the earth from
outer space. A similar yet stronger argument can be made of the boundary between the
territorial seas and the high seas. Yet the impossibility of any State attaining the "high
ground" from any part of the sea immediately discounts any serious consideration of the
perceived parallels between the Law of the Sea and its applicability to space delimitation
and sovereignty.
Perhaps this issue will remain unresolved as long as space continues to be viewed




There is one aspect in which space can be likened to the sea. This is evident in
man's practice of discarding refuse into the environment in which he operates. The sheer
vastness of each environment initially elicited no recognition of the potential for future
problems; the easiest course was to simply ignore the issue. However, today the effects
from such actions on the seas is well known, documented, and studied. Conversely, the
effects from space debris are much less known, though good documentation and an
improving modeling capability has increased our understanding of the problem and the
predicted growth rate of the debris population.
At this time, it can be said that much of the risk space debris poses is a low-
probability, high-consequence event. In other words, a major debris impact is extremely
unlikely presently, but its occurrence would have an enormous consequence if it did.
Additionally, it is postulated that an unchecked growth of space debris will result in a
"runaway" series of spacecraft impacts. This result could lead to the abandonment of
certain orbital altitudes due to high impact probabilities, and could make certain functions
too expensive, or even physically impossible because of the amount of shielding required.
B . TYPES OF DEBRIS
1 . Natural
Observation has shown that there is a total of 200 kg of meteoroid mass within
2000 km of the Earth's surface at any given time; this region contains the most often used
orbits for spacecraft [The National Science and Technology Council, 1995]. These
meteoroids are the product of fragmentation and disintegration of comets and asteroids that
orbit the sun (heliocentric orbits) and pass through the Earth's orbital space. They typically
range in size from a fraction of a micron to millimeters in diameter [International Academy
of Astronautics, 1993].
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Historically, this "steady rain", or flux, of meteoroids comprised the original design
environment for spacecraft. Numerous measurements were conducted in the 1960s to
determine this meteoroid flux. Results showed the probability that lm 2 of spacecraft
surface in low Earth orbit (LEO) would be struck by a 1 cm diameter meteoroid during a
year in space is approximately 1:1,000,000 |National Research Council, 1995 J.
The flux of meteoroids upon spacecraft in Earth orbit and upon the Earth itself is
often used as a "threshold" when discussing the flux of the orbital debris environment.
Most of this meteoroid mass is in objects about 0.01 cm in diameter with an average
density of 0.5g/cm3 . Figure 1 shows the estimated meteoroid flux at 500 km altitude. The
flux will vary with altitude, dependent upon the Earth's shielding and gravity. Typical
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Figure 1. Meteoroid environmental 500km altitude. [From National Research Council, 1995]
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2 . Orbital
Since 1957, more than 4500 spacecraft have been launched into space. Today,
almost 2200 remain in orbit of which only approximately 450 are still functional. The rest
are non-functional spacecraft and are considered debris, yet they comprise only a fraction
of the total of Earth-orbiting debris (National Research Council, 1995]. This man-made
debris is estimated to have a combined mass of 3,000,000 kg within 2000 km of Earth
[The National Science and Technology Council, 1995 1. The average relative velocity of
these objects is 10 km/s (-22,000 mph) with maximum values of 14 km/s.
The U.S. Space Surveillance Network (SSN) has cataloged 23,000 space objects
since 1957, and almost one third remain in orbit today [National Research Council, 1995 J.
It is important to note that this number represents only those which currently can be sensed
from Earth; the actual number of pieces of orbital debris is estimated to be in the trillions.









Figure 2. Catalogued space objects, 1994. [From National Research Council, 1995]
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a. Rocket Bodies
Spacecraft inserted into LEO generally leave only one expended rocket body
in orbit. Spacecraft traveling to geosynchronous orbit (GEO) usually leave two rocket
bodies in various intermediate orbits; one will be in a highly elliptical geosynchronous
transfer orbit (GTO), and the other will be used for final orbit insertion before being
discarded. These rocket bodies pose a danger to present and future functional spacecraft
whose orbits intersect these transfer and insertion orbits. Some payloads, however, are
designed to remain attached to their orbital insertion stage and therefore greatly reduce the
hazard of future collision.
Undoubtedly the greatest hazard these rocket bodies represent while in orbit
is contained within them; large amounts of unspent fuel and other energy sources could
potentially cause an explosion years after mission accomplishment . Figure 3 shows the
typical detectable debris produced by a Proton launch to GEO.
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Figure 3. Typical Proton launch debris. [From National Research Council, 1995]
b . Mission-related Debris
This type of debris is released as a result of a spacecraft's deployment,
activation, and operation. Some of these items consist of the following: parts of explosive
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bolts, spin-up and spring-release mechanisms; packing devices and release cords securing
solar panels and other appendages; lens covers; and objects thrown away or dropped
during manned activities. The amount of debris can be quite large, but is diminishing as
designs are adopted which no longer release such objects. Much of this mission-related
debris is small and cannot be detected and cataloged by any surveillance network. [National
Research Council, 19951
One other type of debris worth discussing is solid rocket motor (SRM)
ejecta. These motors are typically used to transfer spacecraft from low altitude parking
orbits in LEO to a GEO orbit. Their fuel is a mixture of aluminum particles (used to
dampen burn rate instabilities) and propellant. During the burn process, a large amount of
aluminum oxide (A1 2 3 ) dust is formed and ejected in the exhaust plume with a
characteristic diameter of 10 microns; as many as 1020 particles may be generated. Though
these particles have relatively short orbital lifetimes, it appears that there is a high average
on-orbit population present at any one time. This long-term exposure of payloads can
cause erosion of exterior surfaces and can degrade items such as optical windows and solar
panels.
Another type of ejecta, though much smaller in number, is 1 cm or larger
sized chunks of unburned SRM propellant called slag. This slag will not finish burning
outside the pressurized rocket motor body.
c . Fragmentation
This type of debris poses the greatest threat to present and future orbital
spacecraft . This debris is created from spacecraft breakups and the products of
deterioration. There have been 124 known breakups since the first one in June, 1961. Of
the 8100 cataloged objects produced by this source, over 3100 still remain in orbit. This
amount is 40% of the U.S. space object catalog.
Fragmentations that are the result of explosions are the dominant mechanism
in the creation of larger-sized debris. Reasons for explosions are: (1) propel 1ant-related
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explosions (high energy explosions), (2) catastrophic failure of internal components such
as batteries, (3) failure of low pressurized tanks (low energy explosions), and
(4) intentional destruction. Fragmentations can also be caused by a collision with another
orbiting body, however there have been no such events confirmed. [The National Science
and Technology Council, 1995J
Debris fragments created by the deterioration of products used on spacecraft
are generally believed to be caused from the effects of atomic oxygen, solar radiation, and
thermal cycling. Most of these debris particles are less than 0.05 cm in size and depart the
spacecraft with low relative velocities. These fragments are items such as pieces of thermal
blankets, protective shields, solar panels, and the flaking of small paint chips from
spacecraft; it is thought that atomic oxygen erodes the organic binder of the paint. Paint is
used extensively on both rocket bodies and spacecraft for thermal control. However, it
was not until a paint chip (<lmm in diameter) caused an impact crater on the window of the
STS-7 Shuttle mission in 1983 that the magnitude of this problem was fully recognized
[National Research Council, 1995]. Table 1 lists the currently known causes of
fragmentations.
Cause % of Events % Fragments Still in
Orbit
Unknown 22 43
Propulsion Related 36 42
Deliberate 38 13
Systems Related* 4 2
* Electrical, command and control systems
Table 1 . Causes of satellite fragmentations. [From The National Science and Technology Council, 1995]
d. Non-functional Spacecraft
The majority of spacecraft in orbit are non-functional . Once they have
reached their end of life (EOL), by either termination or malfunction, they are left in their
final orbit or in some cases are reorbited to a slightly higher or lower altitude. Once a GEO
spacecraft's maneuvering propellant is expended it will begin its free motion due to Earth
and luni-solar perturbations. Essentially, it will trace a larger and larger "figure-eight" as
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seen from Earth; the maximum inclination reached will be approximately +/-15 degrees and
its longitudinal position will no longer be constant. [International Academy of Astronautics,
1993]. Therefore, most GEO spacecraft are reorbited to a disposal orbit at EOL to preclude
the risk of collision with a functioning GEO spacecraft. LEO spacecraft can be reorbited to
higher altitudes resulting in much longer orbital lifetimes, or they can be transferred to
orbits of 600 km in altitude or below where the expected orbital lifetime is 25 years or less.
C. TRACKING AND DETECTION
1 . Tracking
a. Russian Space Surveillance System (SSS)
This system is operated by the Russian military. It consists of 10 radars
that operate in either the very high frequency (VHF), ultra high frequency (UHF), or C-
band frequency ranges and 12 optical and electro-optical facilities. The radars are used to
detect and track objects in low Earth orbits, while the optical and electro-optical facilities are
employed for high orbit detection and tracking. These Russian facilities are located across
only one-half to two-thirds of the eastern hemisphere, and all are above 40 degrees north
latitude. This causes some major breaks in observation; the SSS catalog does not include a
large portion of GEO objects and the tracking of highly eccentric, low inclination orbits is
periodic. See Figure 4. [National Research Council, 1995J
The data collected is processed at the Russian Space Surveillance Center and
then entered into their space object catalog; identification of detected objects, updates of
space object orbital elements, planning for future observations, orbital lifetime
determination, and sharing of information with other space programs are also performed by
the Center.
b. U.S. Space Surveillance Network (SSN)
This network is operated by the U.S. Space Command in the Cheyenne
Mountain Complex, Colorado Springs, Colorado. It consists of more than 20 radar and
optical sensors, most of which are tasked on an "as-needed" basis. Like the SSS, radars
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are used for low altitude and optical sensors for high altitude observation; there are some
deep space sensor radars capable of detecting objects in GEO. The SSN sensors are much
more globally located than those of the SSS.
The U.S. Space Control Center processes the collected data and
generates/maintains a space object catalog. Orbital elements are then released back to the
sensors to allow for continued tracking of detected objects; selected satellite operators and
space system users are able to access this data. Launches and U.S. space shuttle
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Figure 4. Sensors of SSS and SSN. [From National Research Council, 1995]
c. Comparisons
Both the U.S. and the Russian space surveillance systems are able to track
objects as small as approximately 10 cm in LEO, however the SSN is considered more
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complete for objects in the range from 10 to 50 cm. The U.S. Space Command's
Cheyenne Mountain Complex in Colorado Springs has "The Bolt", a 4"x 1/2" bolt that is
the approximate size of the smallest object that the SSN can track. As orbital altitude
increases, the minimum detectable size for radar systems rapidly decreases so that by 5000
km, the smallest object detectable is about 1 meter in diameter. Above this altitude, optical
telescopes are the primary means used for detection and tracking; they are capable of
tracking 1 meter objects in GEO. However not all objects 1 meter or larger in size are
tracked in GEO. It should be noted that both systems actually underrepresent the total of
objects in highly elliptical orbits (HEO), high altitude circular orbits, and in low inclination
orbits. This is a function of the high altitudes in the first two instances, and a function of
the relative lack of sensors at low latitudes in the latter case.
2 . Detection Facilities
The following are descriptions of a few of the sensors which make up the SSN and
which employ some of the best technology in the world used for space debris detection.
a. Goldstone Deep-Space Communications Complex
This 3 cm wavelength radar has been used to collect orbital debris data,
though not originally designed nor intended to do so. Goldstone is capable of detecting
2 mm objects at 1000 km altitude; the mode of collection is to generally "look" straight up
(90° elevation) and then count the debris that passes through the radar's beam (beam park
mode). Over one such collection period, Goldstone was able to detect roughly 150 objects
larger than approximately 0.2 cm in diameter. Full-time debris observations using
Goldstone are very limited due to its primary mission commitment to monitor deep space
missions. (The National Science and Technology Council, 1995]
b . Haystack Radar
Also a 3 cm wavelength radar, the Haystack radar is located near Boston,
Massachusetts. It is one of the most powerful radars in the world. Like the Goldstone
radar, it has been used in the beam park mode to monitor the orbital debris population for
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the last four years; it can detect a 0.3 cm object at 350 km altitude to a 0.7 cm object at 1400
km altitude. If the radar is used to detect objects near the horizon (south-pointing mode),
the smallest object detectable is about 1 cm. [National Research Council, 1995
J
c. Liquid-metal Mirror
One of the more interesting devices used to measure the population of small
orbital debris is a 3 meter diameter telescope mirror located near Cloudcraft, New Mexico.
The telescope's mirror is formed by rotating a pool of liquid mercury in order to maintain
the necessary parabolic shape for the reflecting surface. It is able to detect debris as small
as 2.5 cm at 900 km, and less than 10 cm at GEO. This type of mirror costs 10 times less
than its equivalent glass mirror. [Orbital Debris Monitor, 1996J
d . Air Force Maui Optical Station (PLIAMOS)
Located at the Phillips Laboratory on the island of Maui, Hawaii, the goal of
AMOS has been to estimate the debris population and to develop techniques to increase the
detection sensitivity in order to detect and track smaller, thus uncataloged, debris. AMOS
uses a Ground-based Electro-Optic Deep Space Surveillance (GEODSS) telescope as a
detection sensor which records a video signal for later processing and display. [Maclay,
1995]
In spite of the above capabilities of the U.S. sensors, there is still much that can and
should be accomplished in the study of space debris. One of the findings of the National
Research Council's Committee on Space Debris is worth noting [National Research
Council, 1995 J:
There has been no systematic approach to sampling space for orbital debris; most
sampling to date has been performed when the opportunity arose, resulting in a series of
investigations that studied a limited region of space over a limited amount of time. There
is a need for national or international strategies to help prioritize detector development,
data collection, and analysis of historical and new data. Such strategies are necessary to
gain a better understanding of the sources of small and medium debris and the variations
in these populations with respect to altitude, inclination, and time.
Figure 5 shows an estimate of the debris population in LEO derived from data
collected from the various SSN sensors. Much of the data was collected from NASA's
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Long Duration Exposure Facility (LDEF) which was an in situ debris detector which spent
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Figure 5. LEO debris population estimate from various sensors. [From National Research Council, 1995)
D. FACTORS AFFECTING DEBRIS
1 . Fragmentation Forces
Some of the causes for spacecraft fragmentation have been discussed above.
However, the following discussion will focus on the effects of an explosive breakup or
collision upon the debris that is generated.
Right after fragmentation occurs, the debris will scatter at various velocities. These
velocities can be broken down into tangential, radial, and normal components. They affect
each piece of debris as follows: tangential velocity will increase/decrease the perigee and/or
apogee and thus the eccentricity; radial velocity will change the eccentricity; and a normal
component will change the inclination of the initial orbit. As a result of these various
velocities, the debris will form a toroidal cloud which will continue to spread until is
bounded only by the limits of the maximum altitudes (normally several hundred kilometers)
and inclinations. See Figure 6. This debris dispersion will eventually manifest itself as a
thin shell about the Earth with a hole at each pole. The rate of dispersion is a function of
the magnitude of the velocity components and the orbital characteristics of the spacecraft;
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the larger the components, the faster the evolution takes place. | National Research Council.
19951
Phase 1 Phase 2 Phase 3
Figure 6. Evolution of a debris cloud. [After National Research Council. 1995]
2 . Natural Forces
For LEO space objects, there are really only two major perturbations that will
markedly affect and therefore significantly reduce orbital lifetimes.
a. Atmospheric Drag
Atmospheric drag is the principal force acting on space objects below 600
km in orbital altitude . Orbital energy is lost through drag forces created when the object
encounters the upper reaches of the Earth's atmosphere; this eventually causes the object to
spiral into denser atmospheric regions where it will usually burn up due to friction effects.
The rate at which a space object losses altitude is a function of its cross-sectional area,
mass, and the atmospheric density. This relationship for the acceleration due to drag. an . is
shown by equation 1. |Space Mission Analysis and Design, 1992|
aD =-(l/2)p(C nAc/'m)V
2 |1|
where p = atmospheric density
CD= coefficient of drag
A = satellite cross-sectional area
m = satellite mass
V = satellite velocity w.r.t. the atmosphere
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The atmospheric density at any given altitude will vary due to the 11 -year
solar cycle; it can differ by more than a factor of 10 over the 11 -year cycle. [National
Research Council, 1995] The last two peaks occurred in 1981 and 1991. An increase in
solar activity will heat up the Earth's upper atmosphere. This expansion increases the
atmospheric density, with the result being an increased orbital drag during solar maximum
periods. Figure 7 shows the predicted orbital lifetimes for objects in circular LEO. The
two lines are given for each object in order to show the solar cycle effects. Objects with
high cross-sectional area-to-mass ratios decay much faster than objects with low area-to-
mass ratios . Because it is hard to predict solar cycles and due to the uncertainty in
calculating area-to-mass ratios of space objects, orbital decay predictions are very difficult
to determine.
b . Solar Radiation
Solar radiation causes periodic variations in all of the space objects' orbital
elements. Again, it is strongest if the object has a high area-to-mass ratio. The magnitude
of the solar radiation acceleration, aR , is shown by equation 2. [Space Mission Analysis
and Design, 1992J
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Figure 7. Orbital decay time versus altitude. [From National Research Council, 1995]
The "cleansing" effect on space objects during high solar cycle periods is
vastly diminished at higher altitudes; the result is a steady increase of man-made objects.
Once medium Earth orbits (MED) and GEO altitudes are reached, there are no significant
natural forces present to aid in space object decay . Objects in GEO have lifetimes in excess
of one million years. See Table 2 for a comparison of orbital lifetimes of an average-type
satellite in circular orbit. |The National Science and Technology Council. 1995
1
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Orbit altitude (km) Lifetime
200 1 - 4 days
600 25 - 30 yrs
1000 2000 yrs
2000 20000 yrs
Table 2. Lifetime of circular orbits. [After Flury and McKnight, 1993]
E. DEBRIS CHARACTERISTICS
1 . Orbital Regions
Space, much like Earth, is not a universal dumping ground for debris. Areas of
higher usage will contain the vast bulk of the orbital debris population. Because of the
desirable qualities of these orbits and the increasing demand placed on them, they will
continue to see an increase in debris generation.
a. LEO
These orbits pertain to altitudes below 2000 km . It is here that the bulk of
the world's satellites are found. Most are either in circular or near-circular orbits with
orbital periods from 90-150 minutes. These orbits require the use of much smaller launch
vehicles to place payloads in orbit, or one large vehicle can be used to place up to 10
satellites in orbit. Another factor for LEO use is its proximity to Earth. These lower
altitudes allow for higher resolution images to be taken by remote sensing satellites. Also,
it is at the LEO altitudes at which human operations currently take place. Space Shuttle
missions generally take place at less than 600 km, the Mir space station is between 350^50
km, and the planned International Space Station will operate at 350 - 500 km in altitude.
b. Sun-synchronous
This type of LEO orbit rotates so as to maintain an approximately constant
orientation with respect to the sun . This requires a certain amount of orbital precession
with respect to the Earth every day. These orbits will pass daily or periodically over a
particular geographic location at the same local time. This feature will give specific lighting
conditions for a each point on the Earth as the spacecraft passes over head, a valuable effect
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for remote sensing satellites. As such, one important orbital element feature of sun
synchronous orbits is that they all have inclinations greater than 90 degrees; inclination
increases for increasing orbital altitude. Altitudes near 900 and 1500 km are the most
widely used.
c. GEO
These orbits are circular with orbital periods of 1436 minutes (~24 hours).
Geostationary satellites (inclination = degrees) appear essentially fixed in the sky and
therefore do not need to be tracked by ground antennas, thereby simplifying
communications. Geosynchronous satellites have a small inclination and trace a "figure-
eight" in the sky; tracking is then required.
d. Semi-synchronous
These circular and near-circular orbits are at approximately 20,000 km in
altitude and have a orbital period of 12 hours. The U.S. Global Positioning System (GPS)
and Russian Global Navigation Satellite System make up these satellites found here.
e . Molniya
This highly elliptical orbit (eccentricity, e, is approximately 0.5; e = for a
circle) has an inclination of 63 to 65 degrees and an orbital period of about 12 hours. The
apogee of this orbit is approximately 40,000 km. The perigee and apogee of this type of
orbit will not rotate about the Earth but will remain over a fixed latitude (apogee is placed
over the Northern hemisphere). Molniya orbits are used for early warning and
communications services, as the satellite will spend about 10 of its 12 hour period above
the mid-latitudes of the Northern hemisphere.
Figure 8 shows a "snapshot" depiction of the concentrations of the cataloged space
debris found in the above orbital regimes.
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Figure 8. Cataloged orbital debris. [From National Research Council. 1995]
2 . Debris Population
The previous section discussed the desirable effects of certain orbits/altitudes for
spacecraft use. Of course, this directly affects the debris population found at these various
altitudes. Further, there are principally three general size ranges used to categorize the
debris environment. Table 3 shows a list of these categories.
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Size Appropriate Approximate Detectability Probable Damage







lmm- 10 cm 1 mg-1 kg
<1 mg
May be Probable loss of spacecraft
catalogable in and possible cata-strophic
LEO breakup
Too small to Ranges from surface
catalog, too few degradation through
for most in-situ component damage and
sampling possible loss of spacecraft
capability
Detectable by Degradation of surfaces
in situ sampling and possible damage to
unprotected components
Table 3. Debris size conventions. [After National Research Council, 1995]
It is important to note that only some of those objects larger than 10 cm have been
numerically counted, i.e., catalogued. The populations of the medium and small-sized
debris comes chiefly from extrapolations based on terrestrial and in-situ measurements and
models.
a. Large Debris ( > 10 cm)
Currently, the United States Space Command (USSPACECOM)
"boxscore" of cataloged space objects (includes satellites and debris) is almost 8100. This
represents only 0.02% of the estimated total number of objects to be in orbit. However, it
also represents approximately 99.93% of the estimated total mass of objects in orbit.
Recall the total estimated in-orbit mass to be 3,000,000 kg. At altitudes less than 2000 km,
debris produced from fragmentation events dominates the cataloged objects. Between 2000
and 16,000 km, mission-related debris dominates, and at altitudes greater than 16,000 km,
spacecraft and rocket bodies make up the majority. This shift in distribution is probably
more due to the reduced capability of terrestrial sensors to detect smaller objects than any
real change in composition of the debris population. [The National Science and Technology
Council, 1995J
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Since most of the cataloged objects are in highly inclined orbits (excepting
GEO orbits), the relative collision velocities between a spacecraft and piece of debris will
be rather high (10-12 km/s). This will give rise to hypervelocity collisions, i.e., collisions
where the results of an impact are not dominated by material strength effects | National
Research Council, 1995|.
In short, since the fraction of objects that cannot be detected increases with
altitude, it is possible that the total uncataloged large debris population could be more
numerous than the total cataloged population |National Research Council, 1995|. Figures
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Figure 10. High altitude space object population. [After National Research Council. 1995]
b. Medium-sized Debris (lmm to 10 cm)
This size debris comprises 99.8% of the total number of pieces of debris
larger than 1 mm, yet this only represents approximately 0.07% of the total mass in orbit.
However, it is the number of objects this represents that is extremely important - estimated
to be approximately 35,000,000.
Most of what is known about the population of this size of debris comes
from the sampling of low-altitude, high inclination LEO orbits with terrestrial sensors.
Refer to Figure 5 for the number of objects with diameters between 10 ' to 10' cm; much of
this data is derived from Haystack radar measurements. It is generally believed that the
source of this size of objects is due to fragmentations and mission-related debris, with
fragmentation debris consisting of the bulk. Further, this medium-sized debris will receive
a greater range of break-up velocities than large-sized debris, thereby placing them into
orbits with a larger range of inclinations, altitudes and eccentricities. However, since
medium-sized debris generally have a higher cross-sectional area-to-mass ratio than large
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size debris, it will experience a more rapid orbital decay. [National Research Council,
1995|
One potentially significant source of debris suggested from the Haystack
data is coolant leakage from the non-functional cores of Russian Radar Ocean
Reconnaissance satellites (RORSATs). Data suggests this large number (tens of
thousands) of 0.6 - 2.0 cm sized debris located from 900 to 1000 km with inclinations
between 60 and 70 degrees were generated from the sodium/potassium coolant used in the
core. | National Research Council, 1995
1
c. Small Debris (< lmm)
Knowledge of this type of debris comes from in-situ experiments (e.g.,
LDEF), the Mir space station, the U.S. Space Shuttle, etc. All of these operate at altitudes
less than 600 km, therefore any extrapolation of the data to higher altitudes is uncertain.
The genesis of this debris is either mission-related or from fragmentation events (by
breakup and deterioration). Compared with medium-sized debris, solar radiation and
atmospheric drag have larger effects on small-sized debris because of even higher area-to-
mass ratios.
One interesting experiment conducted concerning small debris was
performed by the LDEF. It measured the existence of "orbital debris swarms", i.e., a very
large increase in flux (3-5 orders of magnitude) that lasted for several minutes at a time; the
overall lifetime of such swarms was generally several months. Possible sources of these
swarms: the release of dust from spent rocket stages, atomic oxygen erosion of painted
surfaces of objects in HEO orbits, the result of undetected breakups or a hypervelocity
collision between medium-sized debris and a large object. [National Research Council,
1995|
3 . Critical Density
One concept that can elicit a deeper concern for the orbital debris problem is that of
a "critical density". It is defined as the point at which an orbital region contains enough
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objects with sufficient mass so that the rate at which debris is created from collisions is
greater than the removal rate of space objects . In other words, a "chain reaction" of
fragmentation events occurs, though the time scale is on the order of decades or centuries.
Once this reaction has started, it is self-sustaining; it cannot be stopped by a launch rate
reduction. Figure 1 1 shows a comparison of the spatial density (objects/km3 ) and critical
density for LEO altitudes. Shaded regions are above the critical density. These regions
will eventually see an exponential rise in the number of collision fragments.
500 1000 1500
altitude [km]
Figure 11. Critical density in LEO. [From National Research Council, 1995]
This collision growth will not occur over the whole LEO region. Areas of likely
occurrence are: regions with an existing high debris flux (objects/m2-yr), areas with small
atmospheric drag effects, and areas with high collision velocities.
As such, the area below approximately 600-800 km may never exceed the critical
density due to high atmospheric drag effects, though it could see an increase in debris
injected into this region due to collisions at higher orbital altitudes [National Research
Council, 1995].
The possibility of this "collision cascading" happening at GEO altitudes is
uncertain, but will probably not occur. This is because collision velocities here are much
smaller (500 - 800 m/s) than at LEO; this will create fewer fragments per collision. The
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debris that is created will be spread over a much larger volume, thus increasing the spatial
density slowly. Lastly, the debris flux at these higher altitudes is much lower than at LEO.
Therefore, the debris population may well be sustained by launch traffic and in-orbit
explosions.
Figure 12 shows the long term evolution of debris greater than 1 cm. Initial basic
























Figure 12. Long-term collision-cascading effects. [From International Academy of Astronautics, 1993]
4 . Hazards
The probability of collision (PC) occurring between two objects is a function of the
spatial density (SPD, objects/km3 ) of the orbital objects in a given region, the collision
cross-sectional area (A
c
), the objects' relative velocity (V
rcl ), and the period of time the
object is in the region being considered. Spatial density is heavily dependent upon the
orbital altitude of an object, and to a lesser extent its inclination. It is an average value of
the number of objects which reside within 50 km thick concentric volume shells. Figure 13
shows the spatial density of objects in orbit. This figure only categorizes those objects
which are trackable; it has been estimated that there are approximately as many I to 10 cm
debris fragments (generally non-trackable) in LEO than there are trackable objects.
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Further, the PC between two objects occurring in any region increases with roughly the
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Figure 13. Spatial density of USSPACEC0M catalog, 1994. [From National Research Council, 1995]






where SPD = number of objects/km 3
A. = cross-sectional area of satellite, km 2
V
rol
= relative velocity between satellite and object, km/s
T = time of exposure
As an example, the Mir space station has an A
c
of approximately 270 m 2 and an
average altitude of 350 km. If a V
rd of 10 km/s is assumed, then the probability of collision
(with an object 10 cm in size or larger) over a one year period in orbit is approximately
2.Ox l()
4
. or about one collision every 5000 years. |McKnight, 1988|
Another method used to describe the probability that a spacecraft will collide with a
piece of debris is based upon the debris flux (objects/nr-yr) at a given altitude. The
likelihood of being hit by a piece of debris is proportional to the cross-sectional area of the
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satellite and the amount of time exposed to the environment. Figure 14 shows this
cataloged object flux by altitude (assumed V
rcl
of 10 km/s). Again, this does not account
for the risk due to uncataloged debris.
80 2000
Figure 14. Flux of cataloged LEO objects. [From National Research Council, 1995]
Measurements taken using Goldstone, Haystack, and USSPACECOM flux data
reveal that an average sized spacecraft (A
c
=10m 2 ) in a "typical" LEO orbit (~800-1000 km)
has a PC with a 1 cm size object somewhere between 1:100 to 1:1000 over a 10-year
lifetime. Further, the spacecraft will be struck by about one I mm to 1 cm sized particle
and anywhere from 100 to 1000 particles between 0.1 mm and 1 mm in size during the
same 10-year period. |National Research Council. I995| Figure 15 shows an estimate of






Figure 15. NASA prediction of LEO debris. [From National Research Council. 1995]
The discussion above centered upon objects in LEO. The threat of collision
between objects in GEO is greatly lower than LEO, and sharply decreases with distance
from geostationary orbit.
The effects of a collision between a spacecraft and a piece of debris is obviously
dependent upon the mass of the debris and the relative velocity between the two objects; it
is simply a transfer of kinetic energy instantaneously to the satellite upon impact. The
manner in which damage occurs is complicated because of the typical hypervelocity impacts
that occur. However, for spacecraft design it is useful to view the debris problem from the
following perspective | Flury and McKnight, 1993 1:
1
.
Debris less than 0. 1 cm produce surface erosion.
2. Debris between 0. 1 to 1 .0 cm may produce mission-degrading effects,
depending upon passive design provisions, e.g., shielding.
3. Debris larger than 1 .0 cm can produce catastrophic damage.
As an example, a 1 cm aluminum sphere which strikes a satellite with a relative velocity of
about 13 km/s has a kinetic energy equivalent to that of an explosion of 56 grams (0.12
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pounds) of TNT. In other words, it would be like being hit by a 400-pound safe that was
traveling at 60 miles/hour.
Of course, hazards to crewed missions take on a special importance. The
International Space Station is being designed to withstand impacts to critical areas by debris
up to 1.4 cm in size. Provisions are made such that if increased shielding is needed due to
an increased debris threat, extra shields may be transported and deployed after the station is
operational [The National Science and Technology Council, 1995|. The following quote
sums up the hazards to man in space quite well | National Research Council, 1995 J:
Penetration of the pressure wall of a crewed spacecraft can lead to the loss of
cabin pressure, secondary spall impacts on the interior, a light flash, and a pressure pulse.
In addition, cracks created by the impact exceeding the critical crack length for a
pressurized module can, under some conditions, lead to catastrophic fracture or the
uncontrolled mode of crack propagation known as "unzipping".
Astronauts or cosmonauts engaging in extra-vehicular activities are particularly
vulnerable to the impact of small debris. On average, debris 1 mm in diameter is capable
of perforating current U.S. space suits.
F. DEBRIS CONTROL
1 . Background
There are really two considerations when developing methods to reduce the amount
of debris a spacecraft will generate. The first is how the method's decrease in debris
production relates to a reduction in the debris hazard to space operations. The second is the
difficulty and cost of developing and implementing such a method. Viewed another way,
the risk management associated with debris control consists of three measures of
effectiveness - debris prevented, mission penalty, and the cost penalty. Today these are
determined according to policies of the manufacturing and satellite operating companies, yet
in the near future they could shift to more of a global, spacefaring context.
Debris control can be implemented during all three mission phases of a spacecraft's
life cycle: launch and deployment, operations, and mission termination. Further, there are




Design and operations Retrieval
Expulsion of residual propellants and
pressurants
Propulsive maneuvers (deorbit)
Battery safety (vent or fuse) Drag augmentation
Retention of covers and separation devices Solar sail
Propulsive maneuvers (reorbit) Tether, Sweeping, Laser
Table 4. Methods to reduce debris population. [After Flury and McKnight, 1993]
Many of the preventative measures are already in widespread use. However, the
release of mission-related debris could be greatly diminished by better design to eliminate
such release. Further, all spacefaring nations could be encouraged to use disposal orbits,
but this would require the operator to maintain a reserve fuel capacity which cannot be used
for operational longevity.
The chief problem lies in the fact that once debris is put in orbit, only the cleansing
action of the atmosphere will reduce the debris population; this is essentially limited to
orbits of 600 km or less. Debris removal options in practice are, with the exception of
deorbiting or using the Space Shuttle, non-existent. Drag augmentation would work best
for altitudes of 600 km or less. Solar sail usage, which uses solar radiation pressure as the
motive force to slowly change the orbital elements of an object, requires increased costs.
Both the drag augmentation and solar sail methods will greatly increase the cross-section of
the spacecraft thereby increasing the probability of collision with other space debris or
spacecraft.
Using some sort of "debris sweeper" in orbit would require the ability to stop all
sizes of debris expected to be encountered while at the same time not causing any further
fragmentations upon debris impact. Also, the use of lasers has been suggested to
"vaporize" debris. Again the problem of preventing any increase in the number of debris
pieces upon an incomplete vaporization is present. Currently, there is no such technology
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available that can accomplish either, and any development would be costly. Prevention
may well prove to be the cheaper route.
2 . Policies
The control of space debris before the mid-1980s was a practice in denial, though
there were those individuals and groups who persisted in raising the issue of the debris
population growth.
In 1963, an analyst at the Naval Research Laboratory (NRL) wrote two papers
concerning space debris. He looked at the spatial density and the cataloged growth rate of
detectable space debris. Accordingly, he developed an equation that did a good job in
giving an estimate in the growth of the debris catalog. These papers were originally
classified but were declassified in 1975.
However, by 1981, there had been a growing level of interest and awareness about
orbital debris. In 1981, NASA published their "10-Year Space Debris Assessment Plan"
which started a comprehensive research and development effort on technology, analysis
and future policy in the space debris field. Also in 1981, the American Institute of
Aeronautics and Astronautics (AIAA) issued a position paper which stated that space debris
could not be ignored because of its potential permanence and hazard to spacecraft in orbit.
Further, it stated that action was "imperative" and that there was, as of yet, no obvious or
simplistic resolution evident. [McKnight and Johnson, 1994]
Not all talk on the space debris issue was given such a gloomy outlook. The U.S.
Air Force Scientific Advisory Board issued an assessment in 1983 entitled 'The Potential
Threat to U.S. Satellites Posed by Space Debris". Their bottom line opinion was that space
debris was "not a problem but further investigation is recommended." [Johnson and
McKnight, 1994]. How this outlook was derived in the face of the many expert opinions
around the world to the contrary is surprising. However, by 1987, their position had
shifted to where they then believed:
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...space debris represents a growing problem whose seriousness depends on future traffic
and debris management. Even with careful control of future debris 'events' the level of
debris.. .will increase through fragmentation collisions of orbiting objects.
One can hardly wonder if they had seriously looked at the problem in 1983. [Johnson and
McKnight, 1994 J.
Fragmentation events are the single largest cause in the creation of space debris.
From 1973 to 1981, eight Delta rockets (second stages) had exploded in orbit, producing
an average of 185 trackable objects per event. These second stages were discarded rocket
bodies; most had still contained several hundred pounds of hypergolic fuel. The problem
was that it was somehow mixing and exploding. Therefore, in 1982, NASA instituted a
requirement that requires the venting of all unspent propellants and gases from Delta upper
stages to prevent such explosions. Since this policy was instituted, no explosions have
been recorded.
By then it was clear that an implementation of a space debris policy would be
beneficial to all space users, yet it was generally believed that mitigation practices would
cost more than the expected gain. Further, it was viewed that infrequent users would have
little to gain and thus no incentive to participate. Yet, in February 1987, the Department of
Defense (DOD) issued a space policy which stated
DOD will seek to minimize the impact of space debris on its military operations. Design
and operations of DOD space test, experiments and systems will strive to minimize or
reduce accumulation of space debris consistent with mission requirements.
By February 1988, President Reagan's National Space Policy included one statement on
space debris [Johnson and McKnight, 1994J:
All space sectors will seek to minimize the creation of space debris. Design and
operations of space tests, experiments and systems will strive to maintain or reduce
accumulation of space debris consistent with mission requirements and cost effectiveness.
Notice that this was just the DOD policy applied to all sectors of the space field. The 1988
National Space Policy was fairly steeped in mentioning economic practices in order to
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stimulate the burgeoning commercial space launch capability of the nations' rocket
manufacturers.
In November 1989, probably due to economic pressures competing with the
implementation of space debris mitigation practices among the U.S. expendable launch
vehicle (ELV) manufacturers and their drive to stay competitive in the world market, one
sentence was added to the National Space Policy concerning space debris: 'The United
States Government will encourage other spacefaring nations to adopt policies and practices
aimed at debris minimization." While this approach was already in place between non-
governmental organizations, it was now an official U.S. government policy as well.
a. USSPACECOM
On 6 June, 1991, the USSPACECOM issued its "Minimization and
Mitigation of Space Debris" - Regulation 57-2. Its first paragraph essentially restates the
1989 National Space Policy. The rest of the regulation assigns the following
responsibilities for the operation, development, and conception of current and future space
system [Johnson and McKnight, 1984]:
a. Through its component commands, USSPACECOM will foster activities to better
understand the evolution of space debris and the hazards of orbital debris to military,
civilian and commercial space activities.
b. Component space commands shall increase awareness of the requirement to mitigate
space debris. They shall monitor space debris mitigation efforts of their material
development activities, and within their authority, assure that mitigation of space debris
is addressed explicitly in all space systems developments and upgrades.
c. The design and documentation process for space system development, modification, or
upgrade will permit clear identification of cost, schedule, and performance impacts of
efforts to mitigate debris. System development or modification tradeoffs which affect the
above in order to minimize debris shall be reviewed by and approved by the affected
Service component space commands and coordinated with the United States Space
Command.
d. The justification for measures to mitigate and minimize debris or the effects of
hypervelocity impact upon space systems should reflect robust technical investigation and
research. Component Commands shall focus research to quantify cost, schedule, and
performance impacts on system development
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Note especially part c. of the regulation. This was probably the first time that costing
analysis was required to be generated in efforts to mitigate debris . Since the contractors
who furnish spacecraft for government use are generally the same who supply the
commercial market, any effort expended on their part to be in compliance with
Regulation 57-2 might not be cost effective if it wasn't carried over to commercial
applications.
b. NASA
On 5 April, 1993, NASA issued the first agency-wide binding guidance in
order to implement the National Space Policy of 1989. It was NASA Management
Instruction (NMI) 1700.8 - "Policy for Limiting Orbital Debris Generation". Its purpose
was to limit the generation of orbital debris from all NASA programs and projects.
Notably, it also defines orbital debris as:
...artificial, human-generated debris. Specifically, the term refers to the following:
1) payloads that can no longer perform their mission: 2) rocket bodies and other hardware
left in order as a result of normal launch and operational activities; and 3) fragmentation
debris produced by failure or collision. Gases and liquids in free state are not considered
orbital debris.
The implementation of the policy was to be phased in and not to be considered retroactive.
For example, a program beyond its preliminary design review (PDR) would only have to
consider mission planning and operational procedures that affect debris generation; this was
to minimize the costs involved. [Johnson and McKnight, 1994]
Therefore, in order to assist with the implementation of NMI 1700.8, a
handbook was developed - NASA Safety Standard 1740 - "Guidelines and Assessment
Procedures for Limiting Orbital Debris". This handbook is landmark as it establishes a
consistent set of standards and criteria to be used by NASA programs and projects . It
identifies five areas requiring debris assessment and states the guidelines for each. See
Table 5. Further, it states guidelines for policy implementation, supplies methods for
evaluating programs, and delineates reporting procedures and responsibilities.
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Debris Assessment Areas Guideline Description Comments
Release of debris during
normal mission operations
• Limit number, size, and orbit
lifetime of debris larger than 1mm
• Limit lifetime of objects passing
through GEO
Includes staging components,
deployment hardware or other
objects larger than 1 mm that are
known to be released during normal
operations
Tethers or tether fragments left in
orbit are considered operational
debris
Accidental explosions • Limit probability of accidental
explosion during mission
operations
Deplete on-board stored energy at
end of mission life
Includes systems and components
such as range safety systems,
pressurized volumes, bipropellant
fuels, and batteries
Intentional breakups • Limit number, size, and orbit
lifetime of debris larger than 1 mm
• Assess risk to other programs for
times immediately after a test when
the debris cloud contains regions of
high debris density
• No assessment of orbital hazard
for breakups occurring below
altitude 90 km
Intentional breakups include tests
involving collisions or explosions
of flight systems and intentional
breakup during space system reentry
to reduce the amount of debris
reaching the ground
Collisions with large debris
during mission operations
Assess probability of collision
with intact space systems or large
debris
Collisions with intact space
systems or large debris will create a
large number of debris fragments
that pose a risk to other operating
spacecraft. A significant
probability of collision may
necessitate design or operational
changes
Collisions with small debris
during mission operations
Assess and limit the probability of
damage to critical components as a
result of impact with small debris
Damage by small debris can result
in both mission failure and failure
to perform postmission disposal. A
significant probability of damage
may necessitate shielding, use of
redundant systems, or other design
or operational modifications
Postmission disposal Remove spacecraft and upper stages
from high value regions of space so
they will not threaten future space
operations
Options are to transfer to a disposal
orbit or transfer to an orbit where
the space system will reenter within
25 years. Disposal orbits are
defined away from LEO, GEO, and
semi synchronous (12 hour) circular
orbit
Debris surviving reentry and
impacting in populated areas
Limit number and size of debris
fragments that survive uncontrolled
reentry
This guideline limits human
casualty expectation
Table 5. Debris assessment issues and guidelines. [After Maclay, 1995J
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The following is an overview of the NASA handbook.
Debris released during normal operations : This is best described as mission-
related debris. The goal is to limit debris 1 mm in size or larger (i.e., mass of lmg or
larger) as such debris could cause functional failure upon colliding with a spacecraft, or 10
cm or larger (mass of 1 kg or larger) which could cause a fragmentation event. This is
accomplished by limiting the total area-time product to no larger than 1 m2-yr. The area-
time product is defined as the sum over all operational debris of the debris cross-sectional
area multiplied by the total time spent below 2000 km altitude during the lifetime of each
debris object. GEO debris objects created of 5 cm or greater in size are to be able to clear
GEO altitude within 25 years. [Maclay, 1995]
Debris generated b\ explosions and intentional breakups : Here, the
guidelines set the probability of accidental explosion during mission operations at 0.0001.
Further, it also requires the depletion or venting of all on-board sources of stored energy
upon mission completion. For intentional breakups, no debris larger than 1 mm will
remain in orbit longer than 1 year; it also limits the area-time product to 0.1 m2 -yr.
Additionally, any planned destruction of a structure as a reentry procedure must occur no
higher than 90 km. [Maclay, 1995]
Debris generated by on-orbit collisions : The objective is to limit the
probability of a spacecraft becoming a source of debris by collision with either man-made
debris or meteoroids. A probability of 0.001 or less is set for a large object collision, and
0.01 is set for small debris of size sufficient to cause loss of control to prevent post mission
disposal. [Maclay, 1995]
Post-mission disposal of space structures : The guidelines direct that objects
will be removed from orbit in a timely manner or maneuvered to a disposal orbit where they
will not interfere with future space operations. For LEO spacecraft, three options are
available: atmospheric reentry, maneuvering to a disposal orbit, or direct retrieval to be
accomplished within 10 years of mission completion. Figure 16 shows the storage options
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for orbits above LEO. A probability of success of 0.99 or greater is required for the
performance of post-mission disposal. |Maclay, 1995|
Debris reentry risk : The guidelines here seek to limit the risk of human
casualty by limiting the size of debris components and structural fragments that survive



























Figure 16. Storage orbit options for post-mission disposal. [From Maclay, 1995]
c. Federal Communications Commission (FCC)
This agency licenses and regulates commercial telecommunication satellites.
Its authority is derived from the Communications Act of 1996 (previously, the
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Communications Act of 1934, as amended); this authority encompasses the ability to issue
orders and make rules. Satellites fall within the FCC's regulatory authority because they
are considered radio stations.
It appears that the FCC does have the authority to prescribe rules concerning
the disposal of telecommunications satellites upon the completion of their operational
mission. The FCC could base its argument for such authority upon the premise that a non-
operational satellite could collide with an operational satellite and therefore disrupt
communications by radio. However, to date, the FCC neither requires their licensees to
use GEO disposal orbits or to deorbit LEO satellites. This is probably due to the FCC's
lack of an adequate technical basis for adopting such a requirement, and because most
satellite operators already boost their GEO satellites to disposal orbits. This might change
over the next decade when the introduction of large LEO satellite constellations arrive in





Teledesic 840 700 98.2
Iridium 66 780 86.0
Globalstar 48 1400 47.0
Odyssey 12 10360 55.0
Aries 48 1020 90.0
Ellipsat 24 500-1250 63.5
Vita 2 800 99.0
Orbcom 18 970 40.0
Starsys 24 1340 50-60
Table 6. Proposed LEO constellations. [From The National Science and Technology Council, 1995]
d . Department of Transportation (DOT)
On 24 February 1984, Executive Order 12465, Commercial Expendable
Launch Vehicle Activities, ordered the creation of the Office of Commercial Space
Transportation (OCST) in the DOT to license and approve private space launches. Its
authority, provided by the Commercial Space Launch Act of 1984, is now codified in Title
54
49, U.S. Code. The OCST is to regulate the commercial space transportation industry, but
only to the extent necessary "to ensure compliance with the international obligations of the
United States and to protect the public health and safety, safety of property, and national
security and foreign policy interests of the United States." [OCST Strategic Plan, 1995]
This oversight is provided through the application of two distinct reviews -
the mission review and the safety review; no license is issued before their completion. The
mission review is primarily concerned with the launch vehicle, payload (U.S. or foreign)
and the flight plan (path) in order to insure that U.S. responsibilities under international
treaties (i.e., the Outer Space and Liability Convention) are met. Further, orbital debris,
on-orbit safety, and reentry hazard issues and risks must be addressed. This includes an
on-orbit risk analysis assessing risks posed by a launch vehicle to operational satellites as
well as a reentry analysis assessing risks to third parties as a result of reentering debris or
reentry of the launch vehicle or its components. The review must also consider how the
mission will affect national interests. This authority extends to only those payloads that are
not licensed by the FCC or the National Oceanic and Atmospheric Administration (NOAA).
IFederal Register, 1996]
On 16 November, 1995, the OCST was transferred intact from the Office of
the Secretary to the Federal Aviation Administration (FAA). The OCST is now known as
the Office of the Associate Administrator for Commercial Space Transportation (AST). It
should be noted that the AST, unlike the FCC, conducts extensive research. These areas of
research include flight safety, launch sites, payload safety, reentry spacecraft and
operations, standards, environmental issues, and space safety including orbital debris.
G . INTERNATIONAL TREATIES AND AGREEMENTS
1 . Outer Space Treaty
This document entered into force on 10 October, 1967. Though it contains a basic
philosophical approach on how the world's nations should undertake the exploration and
exploitation of outer space, it is very general in scope when discussing any key ideas and
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terms. As such, it does not implement any policy or put forth any measure on how to
establish a policy which embodies the philosophy and principles of the treaty. However, it
is apparent that the Outer Space Treaty can be considered the cornerstone of the foundation
for the legal principles of outer space. Notably, Articles III, VI, VII, VIII, and IX are
directly relevant in any discussion regarding space debris, and the provisions they contain
apply only to a "State Party" to the Treaty. To date, over one hundred nations are
signatories to this treaty.
Article III
This provision simply establishes the legal regime for outer space: it states
that the activities in the exploration and use of outer space, including the moon and other
celestial bodies, will follow the established principles and rules of international law and the
Charter of the United Nations .
Article VI
States shall bear international responsibility for their national activities in
outer space, regardless of whether it was conducted by the government or by a private
citizen /enterprise (i.e., non-governmental entities); this established a new principle in
international law. Further, these space activities of non-governmental entities must be
authorized and continually supervised by the State in order to ensure they conform with
treaties and international law. However, it should be noted that the scope with which these
private space "activities" should be monitored is not delineated in the article. The U.S. has
monitored activities as follows: NASA has provided supervision for private customers and
users aboard its spacecraft; the Federal Communications Commission (FCC) has
established regulations for non-governmental entities that own or use communications
satellites; the Department of Transportation (DOT), through its Office of Commercial Space
Transportation (OCST), has provided supervision for privately owned launch vehicle




This article establishes the international liability of a State when a space
object is launched . A launching State, a State which procures a launch, or a State from
whose territory or facility an object is launched is internationally liable for damages to
another State and that State's natural or juridical persons (citizens); this liability also
extends to damage caused by the component parts of the object. The damage could be
terrestrial, in the air, or in outer space and on the celestial bodies . Therefore, if a Chinese
Long March launch vehicle carrying a Motorola Iridium payload was involved in an
accident, both nations would be liable for damages to a blameless third party.
* Article VIII
This article provides for the registration and legally establishes the
ownership, jurisdiction, and control over a spacecraft, to include personnel . The State on
whose registry a space object is launched into outer space retains jurisdiction and control
over the object while it is in space. Further, the ownership of a space object and its
component parts is not affected by their presence in outer space or by their return to Earth.
Also, any objects and component parts which fall to Earth are to be returned to the State of
registry upon giving proper identification. If a spacecraft was not registered, it "would be
considered a rogue and likely forfeit any legitimate status and protection under the Outer
Space Treaty or international law." [Space Mission Analysis and Design, 1992)
Since these principles could apply to space debris, the issue of destruction or removal by
one state of debris owned by another state is not clear under international space law, and
could become a highly political matter.
Regardless, since it is clear that state ownership of the component parts of a
space object is not forfeited when in space nor when a spacecraft becomes non-functional,
it could be left up to the state to consent to the destruction or removal of this orbital debris.
Further, if the state abandoned its right to the debris through a clear expression of intent,
any destruction or removal by another state could be viewed as lawful; state property
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remains state property under international law, unless it is expressly relinquished. [The
National Science and Technology Council, 1995]
* Article IX
This article could be considered the "environmental protection" article,
especially with regard to space debris. In accordance with the article, States are obligated
to conduct all their activities in outer space with due regard to the corresponding interests of
other States . In addition, States shall conduct exploration of outer space, including the
moon and other celestial bodies, so as to "avoid harmful contamination!' and shall adopt
appropriate measures where necessary; any spoiling of space could be viewed as
preventing the open access to space guaranteed to all States in the Preamble and Article I of
the treaty. Further, States are also called upon to avoid adverse changes in the environment
of Earth resulting from the introduction of "extraterrestrial matter'''; the U.S. decision to
quarantine astronauts and their spacecraft after the early spaceflights was partially in
response to the dictates of this article [Goldman, 1988].
A State or its nationals planning to conduct an activity or experiment in outer
space that could cause potentially "harmful interference''' with the activities of other States is
obligated to undertake "appropriate international consultations" before proceeding.
Conversely, if a State believes that another State's activities may interfere with its space
activities (or activities in general), consultation may be requested. However, such a
consultation is not a legal obligation of the launching State. Therefore, the consultation will
take place only if the State wants to participate and not if there is harmful contamination.
[Maclay, 1995]
In spite of the above discussions, the most glaring deficiencies in the Outer Space
Treaty have to do with a lack of definition of the terms as applied in the body of the treaty .
It fails to define what "space debris" consists of, or to even provide a definition of a "space
object". Similarly, neither are "harmful interference" nor "contamination" defined. For all
these reasons, it was apparent that further work for an international consensus was needed.
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2 . Rescue Agreement
This agreement entered into force on 3 December, 1968. Most of the Agreement
deals with the rescue and return of astronauts on land and on sea. It was short-sighted in
its approach in that it was drafted to deal with 1960s spaceflight and man's expected flights
to the moon. However, Article 5 of the Agreement does deal with the issue of the return of
space objects . [Goldman, 1988
J
Under the Agreement, a party discovering "a space object or its component parts'",
either in the party's jurisdiction or other jurisdictions not under any State control, shall
notify the launching authority and the Secretary General of the United Nations. The
discovering party is required, upon the request of the launching authority, to render such
steps it finds "practicable" to recover the object or parts. If the discovering party believes
that the object or parts is of a "hazardous or deleterious nature", the launching authority
may be notified, which shall take immediate steps to eliminate possible danger or harm.
Other provisions are the requirement to return the object or parts upon request, and
then only when the launching authority furnishes identifying data, and that all expenses
shall be borne by the launching authority.
One of the more contentious issues in the Agreement was that of the meaning of
"practicable" steps a discovering party might take in the recovery of an object or part.
Foreign relations between two States at the time of discovery might well determine what is
"practicable". Clearly, this agreement has outlived its usefulness in today's world.
3 . Liability Convention
This is the most relevant treaty with regard to orbital debris; it entered into force on
1 September, 1972. The treaty establishes a standard of strict liability for damage on the
surface of the Earth or to aircraft inflight which is caused by space-related activity . Simple
negligence or fault is no defense. Such a draconian philosophy (by today's developing
legal standards for space) was really created because of the general world view (in the
1960s-early 1970s) that space was the domain of two elite players, the U.S. and USSR.
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The feeling was that they alone should bear the risk for their space activities. No ceiling
was set on the compensation that claimants may seek and obtain. IGoldman, 1988]
There are two exceptions to this strict liability standard . The first case is when
damage occurs, other than on Earth, to a space object of one state by the space object of
another State. The latter is liable if the damage is due to its fault or the fault of persons for
whom it is responsible (Article III). In cases of joint liability, damage compensation will
be apportioned between the States at fault; if this cannot be determined, then it will be
divided equally among them (Article IV). The second case, outlined by Article VI, would
exonerate a State from strict liability if the damage "resulted either wholly or partially from
gross negligence or from an act or omission done with intent to cause damage on the part of
the claimant State or of natural or juridical persons it represents" IGoldman, 1988].
However, the convention never delineates as to what constitutes "fault". Further,
that fault must be proven. If it is believed that any production of orbital debris during space
debris shows negligence, then the fault standard is really no different than the strict liability
imposed when space objects cause damage on the Earth's surface. Others believe that
some form of negligence standard is appropriate [The National Science and Technology
Council, 1995]. Because current space technology does not allow for debris-free
operations in space, "reasonable" attempts by a State to control its space objects in order to
preventforeseeable damage might limit, or erase its liability. An example of fault might be
"leaving old satellites and spent parts in orbit.. at least regarding special orbits of great
importance, like GEO orbits or orbits used by manned spacecrafts and space stations"
[Maclay, 1995]. In view of this, States responsible for damages may be unwilling to pay
compensation for a fault that is not mentioned in a treaty.
Therefore, it is apparent that many factors will come into play to determine
"reasonable" actions and "foreseeable" damage. This will certainly change with improving
technology and would have to consider "the proximity of other space objects, the reason
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for the creation of the debris, and the feasibility of providing warnings to States potentially
affected by the debris". [The National Science and Technology Council, 1995 J
By 1972. there had been 34 reported cases of space objects (satellites and rocket
stages) causing re-entry damage. In 1979, the U.S. Skylab reentered over Australia and
left pieces as large as 500 kg strewn about uninhabited areas; the extent of "damage" was
never known. However, the most notable case involving debris reentry and damage
occurred on 4 January, 1978, when the Soviet Ocean Surveillance Satellite, Cosmos 954,
burned up in the atmosphere and fell over 500 km2 of three Canadian provinces. Cosmos
954 had a nuclear power source which contained approximately 50 kg of uranium; all but
two of the pieces found were radioactive, some of them lethally so. [Kuskuvelis, 1993]
Canada made a claim on 23 January, 1979 against the USSR in the amount of
C$6 million for damages caused by Cosmos 954; they based their claim on the Liability
Convention and argued that Cosmos 954 and its nuclear reactor were "space objects" as
defined in Article I. On 2 April, 1981, the USSR paid Canada C$3 million "in full and
final settlement on all matters connected with the disintegration of the Soviet satellite
Cosmos 954..." [Kuskuvelis, 1993J. Since the USSR never formally admitted liability, it
was unclear as to what damages the USSR paid for. Also, because the settlement
procedures of the Convention were not invoked by Canada, it is argued that the Convention
was never applied to the event and therefore any legal interpretation is without merit.
[Baker, 1989, p. 66] However, it was generally recognized that "damage to property of
States" (Article I) did include that damage caused by nuclear contamination.
Regardless of the classification of a space object (or refuse) falling to Earth and
causing damage, it seems apparent that it can be solved either by application of the Liability
Convention or by international customary law; it may not be without difficulty though.
Conversely, existing law does not seem to offer any firm foundation to successfully
conclude any damage issues involving space debris striking a space object. [Maclay, 1995]
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4 . Registration Convention
Early in the space race, it was apparent to most nations of the world that the United
Nations would provide the best forum and therefore should be the focal point for
international cooperation in the peaceful exploration and use of outer space. Accordingly,
on 20 December, 1961, the U.N. General Assembly passed Resolution 1721 (XVI). One
of the provisions of the resolution "calls upon States launching objects into orbit or beyond
to furnish information promptly to the Committee on the Peaceful Uses of Outer Space
through the Secretary-General, for the registration of launchings." Further, it was also
stated that this information will be maintained in a public registry. (Resolution 1721,
1961]. This registration of space objects was not binding upon the U.N. members.
Therefore, it was chiefly a political decision as to whether a spacefaring nation (i.e., the
U.S. and USSR) would participate with full "disclosure". Space at this time was strictly a
playground for strategic and military purposes.
However, by 1975, it was realized that closure was needed with the Outer Space
Treaty's (Article VIII) reference to a State "on whose registry an object launched into outer
space is carried..." and the provisions of the Liability Convention. The desire was to create
a central registry for space objects, again to be maintained by the Secretary-General;
however, participation would now be mandatory. Further, in order to assist in the
identification of a space object (whose meaning was identical to that as stated in the
Liability Convention), the following information would be required [Goldman, 1988]:
1) Name of launching State or States
2) An appropriate designator of the space object or its registration number
3) Date and territory or location of launch
4) Basic orbital parameters, including nodal period, inclination, apogee, and
perigee.
5) General function of the space object.
Accordingly, the Registration Convention entered into force on 15 September 1976.
It assists in the assessing of liability and in the identification of ownership for the eventual
62
cleanup of space debris |Goldman, 1988|. If there is more than one launching State, they
will determine which of them shall register the space object. This convention was seen to
be an aid in identifying a space object (i.e., orbital debris) which has caused damage,
thereby helping the State suffering damage to seek redress from the associated launching
State. If a damaged State cannot identify the space object which caused damage, other
States, particularly those with space monitoring and tracking facilities, may be called upon
to assist "to the greatest extent feasible" in the identification of the debris. [Goldman,
1988].
H. CONCLUSION
The magnitude of the orbital debris problem has long been ignored. If measures
had been taken years ago, the debris "creep" now present might well have been avoided.
Studies will continue in order to better understand and model the debris environment, yet
action is needed today in order to minimize and in some cases, eliminate sources of debris.
NASA's handbook for limiting orbital debris should be the model for all space
manufacturers to emulate. It is clear, concise, yet is not capricious in it guidelines.
However, it is unlikely that there will be unilateral acceptance of debris reduction standards;
only a multilateral agreement will be able to pull the spacefaring nations together.
Possibly one of the only ways to reach a better understanding of the risk small to
medium debris pose is to create a tracking system designed specifically for those sized
objects; the SSN and SSS are not optimized for this type of collection. Further, the data
collected could be entered into an international data base accessible to all interested parties.
Clear and concise definitions are needed in a new international convention on space
debris. The fact that the term "space debris" is never found in any documents is the fuel of
dissent for those who believe the treaties now in force never intended to cover such objects.
From an objective viewpoint, this can hardly be the case. Unfortunately, man desires to
regulate space activities by civil law rather than common law - differing cultures, economic
status, political and world views unfortunately dictate this. This is not lost upon U.S.
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space providers, as they have the most to lose given unilateral technical decisions driven by
U.S. law and policy.
Ultimately, the debris issue may come down to peer review and peer pressure.
Most certainly the U.S. should lead the way in any measures taken. Yet the economic
factors may well greatly influence decisions today, but at what cost tomorrow?
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IV. ADDITIONAL TOPICS
A . BOGOTA DECLARATION
1 . Background
This declaration is interesting as it was a unique attempt by eight equatorial States to
proclaim sovereignty over the geostationary orbital segments above their territory . During
a meeting held in Bogota, Columbia in late November - early December, 1976, these
countries - Brazil, Zaire, Indonesia, Kenya, Columbia, Congo, Uganda, and Ecuador -
adopted a declaration which proclaimed that the GEO orbit is not a part of outer space.
These countries claimed that the GEO orbit it is a physical fact whose existence is solely
dependent upon its unique relationship with Earth-generated gravity. Further, they
considered these orbital segments akin to natural resources and therefore claimed national
sovereignty over them. [Zhukov, 1984]
The U.S. and Soviet response to this claim was that because of existing treaty and
customary law, no claim or national appropriation of space was allowed; clearly twenty-
two thousand miles up was obviously outer space. Additionally, the U.S. believed that the
issue of governing the use of the geostationary orbit was a function of the International
Telecommunication Union (ITU). [Goldman, 1988]
2. International Telecommunication Union (ITU)
The ITU performs functions on an international basis analogous to the role the FCC
plays for U.S. domestic issues; it is one of the oldest international organizations and
became a specialized agency of the United Nations after World War II. The ITU's charter
is contained within the International Telecommunication Convention. Essentially, the ITU
provides for the international registration, distribution, and regulation of radio frequencies
and of the geosynchronous orbital slots. However in reality, the ITU is basically a place
where such radio frequency registration is documented, in addition to providing a forum
where differences between nations can be solved, usually through compromise and in the
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interest of international cooperation. These differences are usually technical in nature, such
as frequency interference between neighboring States.
At the time of the Bogota Declaration, Article 33 of the International
Telecommunication Convention stated [Zhukov, 1984]:
In using frequency bands for space radio services, members shall bear in mind that radio
frequencies and the geostationary satellite orbit are limited natural resources, that they
must be used efficiently and economically so that countries or groups of countries may
have equitable access to both in conformity with the provisions of the Radio Regulations
according to their needs and the technical facilities at their disposal.
It is apparent that all nations are afforded equal access to the GEO region; any deviation by
allowing sovereignty over any portion would conflict with the above provision and the
Outer Space Treaty.
However, in regard to the Bogota Declaration, several of the equatorial nations
claimed such GEO sovereignty because of their desire to protect their populations from
unauthorized direct broadcasts via foreign satellites. Their general fear was one of a
"cultural imperialism" against the them (the receiver nation) by a dominant sender nation.
Additionally, the Soviet Union and many other countries had also argued for years that
"prior consent" is required from a receiver nation in order for another nation to broadcast
across international boundaries. Such broadcasts are seen as violations of the Outer Space
Treaty and the UN charter. IGoldman, 1992]
In view of this, the ITU has written regulations in order to limit this "technical
spillover" by limiting the footprint of the satellite's broadcasting. Further, international
agreements play an important part in the negotiation of trans-border satellite
telecommunications flow.
On 10 December, 1982, the United Nations General Assembly adopted a resolution
called Principles Governing the Use by States of Artificial Earth Satellites for International
Direct Television Broadcasting. This resolution essentially put forth that international
satellite direct television broadcasting should be carried out in "a manner compatible with
the sovereign rights of States, including the principle of non-intervention..." [Space Law
66
and Related Documents, 1 990 1 . However, the United States rejected any legitimacy of this
resolution.
3. Toward a Solution
In 1983, the nations that had put forth the Bogota Declaration had changed their
position of sovereignty over the GEO slots. They now desired to see the establishment
of "general principles to govern the national and equitable use of geostationary
orbit" (Goldman, 19881. This was basically seen as a way of reserving a "fair share''' of
the GEO slots for developing/third world nations. It is not clear if this tact was taken from
a viewpoint that if the principle of national appropriation of space (i.e., sovereignty) was
legitimized, these same nations could find themselves in a "have-nof position simply
because some nations would already "own" considerable regions of space, i.e., the
principle of non-appropriation of space by means of use or occupation would similarly
have to be considered legitimate. [Zhukov, 1984|
Regardless, it was a fundamental opposition by developing nations to the longheld
U.S. position of a "first-come-first-served" with respect to orbital slots; the U.S. believed
any issues could be solved through technology improvements [Goldman, 1992J. However
today, ITU allocation of orbital slots is accepted throughout the world-body , and is within
the framework of the ITU. Article 12 of the International Telecommunication Convention
states that the Radio Communication Bureau (of the ITU) will [International
Telecommunication Union Convention, 1992]:
carry out studies to furnish advice to Members with a view to the operation of the
maximum practicable number of radio channels in those portions of the spectrum where
harmful interference may occur, and with a view to the equitable, effective and economical
use of the geostationary-satellite orbit, taking into account the needs of Members
requiring assistance, the specific needs of developing countries, as well as the special
geographical situation of particular countries.
B . TWO-DEGREE SPACING
Technological limitations of early satellites prevented them from being placed closer
than four-degrees while in GEO positions. These limitations were the result of
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unacceptable radio interference produced by internal components, and from
terrestrial/adjacent satellite sources. Then, in 1983, the FCC published in the Federal
Register a notice of inquiry that requested comment regarding shifting current policy to
two-degree spacing for GEO orbits. The FCC reasoned that approximately 1500 new
transponders could be put in orbit by the 1990s if the change was made. [Goldman, 1988]
There were chiefly two major concerns to the FCC inquiry. The first was one of
economic concern, especially for those operators who used the 4.5-meter antenna dish. It
was believed that undue economic hardship would be placed on the pioneer companies that
had started the communications industry, i.e., the dishes would have to be replaced or
upgraded, making capitalization costs overwhelming. Of course, satellite manufacturers
and carriers would be on the other end of the economic ladder. Secondly, it was thought
by the FCC that such a policy change would be looked upon by developing/third world
nations as a huge "land grab" in space. [Goldman, 1992]
Regardless, the FCC did commit to the two-degree spacing. By 1986, in
conjunction with agreements reached with the ITU and other nations concerning the fair
allocation of these "new" GEO slots, the FCC had already allotted most of its slots for
future U.S. satellite launches.
C. THE ANTI-BALLISTIC MISSILE (ABM) TREATY
1 . Background
The ABM Treaty is unarguably the most important document germane to any
discussion involving the policy implications in the development and testing of an anti-
ballistic missile system. It is a bi-lateral agreement drafted in a period of detente between
the Soviet Union and the United States. Both countries had experimented with ballistic
missile defenses and had come to the conclusion that such a defensive measure would be
easily countered by a buildup in strategic offensive arms. Therefore, not desiring to see
another arms race begun, the U.S. and U.S.S.R. signed the Strategic Arms Limitation
Treaty (SALT I) and the ABM Treaty in 1972.
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Today, the Ballistic Defense Missile Organization (BMDO) overseas the
development of three broad missile programs areas: Theater Missile Defense (TMD),
National Missile Defense (NMD), and the Advanced Technology Program. TMD is
concerned with the protection of U.S. forces, allies and other countries, to include areas of
vital interest to the U.S., from theater missile attack. This includes population centers and
fixed/mobile military units. It is the highest priority program today. NMD systems deal
with the threat of a limited ballistic missile strike against the U.S. homeland. Today, this
threat is labeled as a "rogue" attack by a Third World or terrorist group, or an "accidental"
launch of a ballistic missile elsewhere. Finally, the Advanced Technology Program
supports research on new technologies and offers viable options for existing system
improvement.
In light of the above synopsis, it is really the relationship between the TMD systems
and the ABM Treaty that has generated a great deal of political discussion, controversy and
disagreement as to the intent and interpretation of the ABM Treaty vis-a-vis these systems.
Therefore, the following provides a look at the different interpretations of the treaty the
U.S. government has stood behind since 1972.
2 . Traditional Interpretation
An ABM system is defined by Article II as "a system to counter strategic ballistic
missiles or their elements in flight trajectory". Further, Article II goes on to define an ABM
system as currently (1972) consisting of: ABM interceptor missiles constructed and
deployed in an ABM mode, or tested in an ABM mode; ABM launchers; and ABM radars
constructed, deployed or tested in an ABM mode.
It was evident when the Treaty was drawn up that the technology currently used for
anti-missile purposes was not the "end of the line" for such systems. Further it was also
recognized that new technologies under development would prevent any attempt to specify
appropriate limits on them. President Nixon's belief in 1971 was such that any provisions
drawn up between the two sides should not prevent the development and testing of future
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ABM components in the fixed land-based mode, but that all other forms (air, sea, mobile-
land, and space) of interceptors, launchers, radars, and components should be banned.
Additionally, he stated that [Grabbe, 1991]:
Our objective is to reach agreement on the broad principle that the treaty should not be
interpreted in such a way that either side could circumvent its provisions through future
ABM systems or components. We intend to handle any problems that may arise through
the joint commission and the formal review procedures.
Therefore, in order to deal with these issues, two Articles were included - Article V
and Article VI. Article V forbids the development testing or deployment of futuristic
systems or components that are sea-based, air-based, space-based, or mobile land-based.
Article VI expressly forbids the capability of non-ABM systems to counter strategic ballistic
missiles or their components in their flight trajectory, nor to test non-ABM systems in an
ABM mode.
One final key provision involves the wording of Statement D in the Agreed
Interpretations signed in conjunction with the treaty in 1972. Agreed Statement D was
added at the request of the U.S. Joint Chiefs of Staff in order to allow for the exemption of
the development of a ground-based laser for a fixed land-based defense. Since this project
was classified top secret and was in progress at the time, Statement D allowed for the
development and testing of such a new technology for fixed land-based systems which
protected a specific area, as allowed by the treaty. [Grabbe, 1991]
3 . Broad Interpretation
1985, the Reagan Administration issued an interpretation of the treaty which
supposedly took advantage of a "loophole" in the treaty permitting strategic defense
development if it was based on technology that was not anticipated when the treaty was
signed. The Administration essentially saw Statement D as an escape clause from the
provisions of Article V and VI of the treaty. They claimed that Article V's prohibition on
the testing of air or space-based components applied only to those technologies in existence
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in 1972, and likewise with Article VI - testing components in an ABM mode or with an
ABM capability did not apply to exotic technologies. [MacDonald, 1989)
President Reagan "agreed in principle, but not in practice" with this interpretation.
Of course, Soviet reaction sharply criticized this interpretation, as did many U.S. allies.
4 . Permissive Interpretation
This interpretation essentially arrives at the same conclusion as the broad
interpretation, but under different auspices. This interpretation was actually drawn up early
in the Reagan Administration, before the broad interpretation. Both were used to further
the Strategic Defense Initiative (SDI) development and to seek a "legal" basis to shield it
from attacks by critics.
The permissive interpretation says that the treaty allows for the development and
testing of components of an ABM system if they do not have the full power or accuracy
needed to be effectively used in such a defensive system. Therefore, these components
could not be said to be used "in an ABM mode".
Viewed another way, the permissive interpretation proponents do agree that the
treaty does apply to both traditional and new technologies. However, they also believed
that none of the new technology "devices" then under development and being tested under
SDI programs constituted a "component" as prohibited by Article V of the treaty. This was
because such a device would have to satisfy a myriad of technical specifications and
performance capabilities in order to be called a component. Since these "devices" were said
not satisfy these criteria, they could not be called "components" and were therefore not
subject to testing restrictions under the treaty. [Grabbe, 1991
J
5 . Current Trend
The current U.S. Administration does not deal with any of the legerdemain
discussed above. They seek to reach an agreement with Russia based upon technical
principles based upon the differences between TMD and NMD (or Strategic) systems. This
difference is manifested in the closing velocities between a ballistic missile and its
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interceptor, and upon the maximum range the ballistic missile is attempting to achieve. The
initial agreement states that "missile systems traveling at speeds lower than 3 km/sec are
exempt from the treaty as long as they are not tested against missiles traveling at speeds
greater than 5 km/sec or distances greater than 3500 km." [Foote, 1996]
6. Conclusion
If one disregards the historical context and the common understandings used to
reach an agreement that the 1972 ABM Treaty provided, then one could unabashedly justify
either approach used for either of the Reagan Administration interpretations. Indeed, there
is some merit to the permissive interpretation with respect to components. In retrospect,
perhaps history will better remember that these attempts were correct from the viewpoint
that "the end justifies the means." However, perhaps the U.S. should have more correctly
executed Article XV of the treaty and withdrawn from it entirely.
In the current case, the attempt is being made to define what constitutes an ABM
system as defined in the treaty (i.e. to counter strategic missiles) and what constitutes a
TMD system. Clearly, there is no provision in the treaty for such differentiation. Though
Article XIII and XIV of the treaty allow for amending the treaty due to such issues as
changing circumstances, any such action without the advice and consent of the Senate
would not stand when faced with Constitutional scrutiny.
D. SPACE WARFARE
"Mastery of Space is an important prerequisite for achieving victory in war."
- Dictionary of Basic Military Terms, USSR, 1965 [Lupton, 1988]
Given the above dictum, it might be difficult to imagine why the U.S. does not at
present have a greater capability to conduct space warfare. Certainly one legacy in the
American space odyssey is President Eisenhower's "Open Skies" policy and the effort to
preserve space for peaceful purposes. However, the single-sided Soviet threat of yesterday
is gone and has not been replaced. Or has it conceivably been replaced by the rest of the
world? Certainly the development of Third World space capabilities, not to mention the
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residual capabilities if the former Soviet Union (FSU), could threaten the U.S. and
necessitate the need to counter them. Therefore, one must look at the measures in place that
are responsible to counter such threats. Currently, this mission is assigned to the United
States Space Command (USSPACECOM).
The USSPACECOM, established in 1985, is a unified (functional) command
organized to consolidate military assets affecting U.S. space activities. As such, the
USSPACECOM has four distinct missions to complete: Space Forces Support, Space
Force Enhancement, Space Force Application, and Space Force Control.
.
USSPACECOM' s area of responsibility (APR) is the operational medium of space .
• Space Forces Support
These operations include all actions necessary to sustain spaceborne forces; launch,
on-orbit command and control (C2 ), tracking, and on-orbit servicing and recovery. On-
orbit C2 is achieved through a world-wide network of 28 ground stations, while launch
sites are maintained at Cape Canaveral Air Station, FL, and Vandenburg Air force Base,
CA.
• Space Force Enhancement
These missions provide direct support to air, land, and sea forces through the use
of space systems. They improve the effectiveness of military operations by providing
communications capability early warning, navigation, surveillance, and environmental
monitoring (weather) satellites; This is achieved through a mix of military as well as
commercial satellites.
• Space Forces Application
This will be accomplished through the future acquisition of ballistic missile defense
systems. The Department of Defense (DOD) Ballistic Missile Defense Organization will
provide those systems which will protect the forward deployed U.S. forces and its friends
and allies from limited theater ballistic missile (TBM) strikes. Future systems may provide
for ballistic missile defense of the American homeland. USSPACECOM will provide the
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necessary space-based warning, surveillance and cueing to theater commanders to carry out
TBM defense. Likewise, the same support is currently provided to the North American
Defense Command (NORAD) for the protection of North America against ballistic missile
attack.
• Space Force Control
These operations preserve U.S. ability to conduct space operations and divert,
delay, disrupt, or destroy an adversary's space-based systems capability and terrestrial
infrastructure. This will assure U.S. forces and systems access to and unimpeded
operations in space, while denying the same to the enemy. These missions are
accomplished through surveillance and counterspace operations. Surveillance is provided
by the USSPACECOM's worldwide Space Surveillance Network (SSN) which can detect,
track, identify, and catalog certain space objects in order to provide warning to U.S. space
operations for the protection of space based assets. Counterspace operations are offensive
and defensive operations conducted against an enemy's space forces (space or terrestrial) to
gain and maintain the desired degree (disruption, degradation, denial, or destruction) of
space superiority. This would include the use of anti-satellite (ASAT) weapons, though the
U.S. does not currently posses such a system. [Mantz, 1995]
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V. CONCLUSION
It should be apparent that space laws and policies have not been bounded by
international space laws, but instead by national self-restraint on the part of the spacefaring
nations. Even after 40 years of space exploration, man still follows a haphazard and
incomplete collection of agreements that were written in the first half of this period of
exploration. While technology advancements, applications, and studies of space have
increased man's knowledge exponentially, little has been accomplished to ensure the
responsible use of space. Much of this has been due to the desire on the part of space users
to not lock themselves into a priori rules which could potentially restrict or delay their use
of space. This has especially been true if one looks at the growing problem of space
debris; it is probably only a matter of time before the costs of shielding or the need for
on-orbit spares will decide for us that action is required.
Concerning delimitation, a nation's access to space has never been hampered or
protested by another nation. A logical conclusion drawn is that this would form the basis
of a customary law that will allow the flight of one nation's space vehicle through the
sovereign airspace of another nation, but only while in transit to/from space. While no
such flight occurs today (not even the U.S. Space Shuttle), future technology may well
turn this probability into a reality. Some nations may surely object to such overflight
regardless of whether the vehicle is coming or going to space. They will demand that the
spacecraft obey aircraft laws while in foreign airspace. Though such possible events make
for interesting discussion today, it is not to imperative that laws are needed now in order to
prepare for such an eventuality.
Two points are clear. First, both spacefaring and non-spacefaring nations need to
enact a new set of laws or agreements which are definitive and unambiguous. All of the
treaties discussed contain many noble and well-intentioned articles, but there is an absence
of descriptive definition of the key terms used throughout their passages. Because of this,
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the supposed applicability to a given situation and any inferences or conclusions drawn can
be forcefully and convincingly argued to the contrary. It seems that the hazy language used
when drafting these documents attests to the lack of any real international agreement or a
breakthrough in political/national ideology. Further, there exist no rules of enforcement
nor a defined group who will referee pronounced "violations"; individual nations are left
alone in their determination of a course of action.
The first of these treaties, the Outer Space Treaty, took over ten years of negotiation
before an acceptable text was agreed upon. Consensus concerning new laws and
agreements would be ideal, if it can be reached. However, the ever increasing use of and
dependency on space activities in the world-body today dictates that action be taken before,
rather than after, problems occur. Since the U.S. is the world leader in space, it is
probably time for them to take the lead in the development and implementation of sound
procedures for the use of space; this should be done unilaterally if necessary. While this
could impose economic hardships on U.S. companies or appear to make the U.S.
commercial space market less competitive on the world market, the use of subsidies could
be used to negate such an effect. Of course, the sharing of U.S. technology with other
nations would probably be required in order to attain optimum results and to gain
international support.
The second point is that it is not in the best interests of the United States to abide by
the provisions of a treaty or agreement when it becomes apparent that drastically changed
world circumstances dictate otherwise. A prime example of this is the ABM Treaty. In the
face of current world events, the U.S. has changed its warfighting doctrine, shrunk its
military, and decreased its commitment overseas, yet it has clung to the tenets of this
agreement in the belief that it is still relevant. It is not. While this may seem to be an
obscure issue, one must only study the enormous effort being expended on ballistic missile
defenses to realize that a new era in space warfare is just around the corner. Let us not
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APPENDIX B. TREATY ON PRINCIPLES GOVERNING THE
ACTIVITIES OF STATES IN THE EXPLORATION AND USE
OF OUTER SPACE, INCLUDING THE MOON AND OTHER
CELESTIAL BODIES (OUTER SPACE TREATY)
January 27, 1967
The States Parties to this treaty,
Inspired by the great prospects opening up before mankind as a result of
man's entry into outer space,
Recognizing the common interest of all mankind in the progress of the
exploration and use of outer space for peaceful purposes,
Believing that the exploration and use of outer space should be carried on
for the benefit of all peoples irrespective of the degree o\~ their economic or
scientific development,
Desiring to contribute to broad international co-operation in the scientific
as well as the legal aspects of the exploration and use of outer space for peaceful
purposes,
Believing that such co-operation will contribute to the development of mu-
tual understanding and to the strengthening of friendly relations between States
and peoples,
Recalling resolution 1962 (XVIII), entitled "Declaration of Legal Principles
Governing the Activities of States in the Exploration and Use of Outer Space,"
which was adopted unanimously by the United Nations General Assembly on 13
December 1963,
Recalling resolution 1884 (XVIII), calling upon States to refrain from plac-
ing in orbit around the Earth any objects carrying nuclear weapons or any other
kinds of weapons of mass destruction or from installing such weapons on celes-
tial bodies, which was adopted unanimously by the United Nations General
Assembly on 17 October 1963,
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Taking account of United Nations General Assembly resolution 1 10 (II) of 3
November 1947, which condemned propaganda designed or likely to provoke or
encourage any threat to the peace, breach of the peace or act of aggression, and
considering that the aforementioned resolution is applicable to outer space,
Convinced that a Treaty on Principles Governing the Activities of States in
the Exploration and Use of Outer Space, including the Moon and Other Celestial
Bodies, will further the Purposes and Principles of the Charter of the United
Nations,
Have agreed on the following:
Article I
The exploration and use of outer space, including the moon and other celestial
bodies, shall be carried out for the benefit and in the interests of all countries,
irrespective of their degree of economic or scientific development, and shall be
the province of all mankind.
Outer space, including the moon and other celestial bodies, shall be free for
exploration and use by all States without discrimination of any kind, on a basis
of equality and in accordance with international law, and there shall be free
access to all areas of celestial bodies.
There shall be freedom of scientific investigation in outer space, including the
moon and other celestial bodies, and States shall facilitate and encourage inter-
national co-operation in such investigation.
Article II
Outer space, including the moon and other celestial bodies, is not subject to
national appropriation by claim of sovereignty, by means of use or occupation,
or by any other means.
Article HI
States Parties to the Treaty shall carry on activities in the exploration and use of
outer space, including the moon and other celestial bodies, in accordance with
international law, including the Charter of the United Nations, in the interest of
maintaining international peace and security and promoting international co-
operation and understanding.
Article IV
States Parties to the Treaty undertake not to place in orbit around the Earth any
objects carrying nuclear weapons or any other kinds of weapons of mass destruc-
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tion, install such weapons on celestial bodies or station such weapons in outer
space in any other manner.
The moon and other celestial bodies shall be used by all States Parties to the
Treaty exclusively for peaceful purposes. The establishment o\~ military bases,
installations and fortifications, the testing of any type of weapons and the con-
duct of military maneuvers on celestial bodies shall be forbidden. The use of
military personnel for scientific research or for any other peaceful purposes shall
not be prohibited. The use of any equipment or facility necessary for peaceful
exploration of the moon and other celestial bodies shall also not be prohibited.
Article V
States Parties to the Treaty shall regard astronauts as envoys of mankind in outer
space and shall render to them all possible assistance in the event of accident,
distress, or emergency landing on the territory of another State Party or on the
high seas. When astronauts make such a landing, they shall be safely and
promptly returned to the State of registry of their space vehicle.
In carrying on activities in outer space and on celestial bodies, the astronauts o\
one State Party shall render all possible assistance to the astronauts of other
States Parties.
States Parties to the Treaty shall immediately inform the other States Parties to
the Treaty or the Secretary-General of the United Nations of any phenomena
they discover in outer space, including the moon and other celestial bodies,
which could constitute a danger to the life or health of astronauts.
Article VI
States Parties to the Treaty shall bear international responsibility for national
activities in outer space, including the moon and other celestial bodies, whether
such activities are carried on by governmental agencies or by non-governmental
entities, and for assuring that national activities are carried out in conformity
with the provisions set forth in the present Treaty. The activities of non-govern-
mental entities in outer space, including the moon and other celestial bodies,
shall require authorization and continuing supervision by the appropriate State
Party to the Treaty. When activities are carried on in outer space, including the
moon and other celestial bodies, by an international organization, responsibilitv
for compliance with this Treaty shall be borne both by the international organi-
zation and by the States Parties to the Treaty participating in such organization.
Article VII
Each State Party to the Treaty that launches or procures the launching of an
object into outer space, including the moon and other celestial bodies, and each
87
State Party from whose territory or facility an object is launched, is internation-
ally liable for damage to another State Party to the Treaty or to its natural or
juridical persons by such object or its component parts on the Earth, in air space
or in outer space, including the moon and other celestial bodies.
Article VIII
A State Party to the Treaty on whose registry an object launched into outer space
is carried shall retain jurisdiction and control over such object, and over any
personnel thereof, while in outer space or on a celestial body. Ownership of
objects launched into outer space, including objects landed or constructed on a
celestial body, and of their component parts, is not affected by their presence in
outer space or on a celestial body or by their return to Earth. Such objects or
component parts found beyond the limits of the State Party to the Treaty on
whose registry they are carried shall be returned to that State Party, which shall,
upon request, furnish identifying data prior to their return.
Article IX
In the exploration and use of outer space, including the moon and other celestial
bodies, States Parties to the Treaty shall be guided by the principle of co-opera-
tion and mutual assistance and shall conduct all their activities in outer space,
including the moon and other celestial bodies, with due regard to the corre-
sponding interests of all other States Parties to the Treaty. States Parties to the
Treaty shall pursue studies of outer space, including the moon and other celestial
bodies, and conduct exploration of them so as to avoid their harmful con-
tamination and also adverse changes in the environment of the Earth resulting
from the introduction of extraterrestrial matter and, where necessary, shall adopt
appropriate measures for this purpose. If a State Party to the Treaty has reason
to believe that an activity or experiment planned by it or its nationals in outer
space, including the moon and other celestial bodies, would cause potentially
harmful interference with activities of other States Parties in the peaceful ex-
ploration and use of outer space, including the moon and other celestial bodies,
it shall undertake appropriate international consultations before proceeding with
any such activity or experiment. A State Party to the Treaty which has reason to
believe that an activity or experiment planned by another State Party in outer
space, including the moon and other celestial bodies, would cause potentially
harmful interference with activities in the peaceful exploration and use of outer
space, including the moon and other celestial bodies, may request consultation
concerning the activity or experiment.
Article X
In order to promote international co-operation in the exploration and use of
outer space, including the moon and other celestial bodies, in conformity with
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the purposes of this Treaty, the States Parties to the Treaty shall consider on a
basis of equality any requests by other States Parties to the Treaty to be afforded
an opportunity to observe the flight of space objects launched by those states.
The nature of such an opportunity for observation and the conditions under
which it could be afforded shall be determined by agreement between the States
concerned.
Article XI
In order to promote international co-operation in the peaceful exploration and
use of outer space, States Parties to the Treaty conducting activities in outer
space, including the moon and other celestial bodies, agree to inform the Secre-
tary-General of the United Nations as well as the public and the international
scientific community, to the greatest extent feasible and practicable, of the na-
ture, conduct, locations and results of such activities. On receiving the said
information, the Secretary-General of the United Nations should be prepared to
disseminate it immediately and effectively.
Article XII
All stations, installations, equipment and space vehicles on the moon and other
celestial bodies shall be open to representatives of other States Parties to the
Treaty on a basis of reciprocity. Such representatives shall give reasonable ad-
vance notice of a projected visit, in order that appropriate consultations may be
held and that maximum precautions may be taken to assure safety and to avoid
interference with normal operations in the facility to be visited.
Article XIII
The provisions of this Treaty shall apply to the activities of States Parties to the
Treaty in the exploration and use of outer space, including the moon and other
celestial bodies, whether such activities are carried on by a single State Party to
the Treaty or jointly with other States, including cases where they are carried on
within the framework of international inter-governmental organizations.
Any practical questions arising in connection with activities carried on by inter-
national inter-governmental organizations in the exploration and use of outer
space, including the moon and other celestial bodies, shall be resolved by the
States Parties to the Treaty either with the appropriate international organization
or with one or more States members of that international organization, which





This Treaty shall be open to all States for signature. Any State which does not
sign this Treaty before its entry into force in accordance with paragraph 3 of this
article may accede to it at any time.
2. This Treaty shall be subject to ratification by signatory States. Instruments of
ratification and instruments of accession shall be deposited with the Govern-
ments of the United States of America, the United Kingdom of Great Britain and
Northern Ireland and the Union of Soviet Socialist Republics, which are hereby
designated the Depositary Governments.
3. This treaty shall enter into force upon the deposit of instruments of ratifica-
tion by five Governments including the Governments designated as Depositary
Governments under this Treaty.
4. For States whose instruments of ratification or accession are deposited subse-
quent to the entry into force of this Treaty, it shall enter into force on the date of
the deposit of their instruments of ratification or accession.
5. The Depositary Governments shall promptly inform all signatory and acced-
ing States of the date of each signature, the date of deposit of each instrument of
ratification of and accession to this treaty, the date of its entry into force and
other notices.
6. This Treaty shall be registered by the Depositary Governments pursuant to
Article 102 of the Charter of the United Nations.
Article XV
Any State Party to the Treaty may propose amendments to this Treaty. Amend-
ments shall enter into force for each State Party to the Treaty accepting the
amendments upon their acceptance by a majority of the States Parties to the
Treaty and thereafter for each remaining State Party to the Treaty on the date of
acceptance by it.
Article XVI
Any State Party to the Treaty may give notice of its withdrawal from the Treaty
one year after its entry into force by written notification to the Depositary




This Treaty, of which the English, Russian, French, Spanish and Chinese texts
are equally authentic, shall be deposited in the archives of the Depositary Gov-
ernments. Duly certified copies of this Treaty shall be transmitted by the Deposi-
tary Governments to the Governments oi' the signatory and acceding States.
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APPENDIX C. AGREEMENT ON RESCUE OF ASTRONAUTS,
THE RETURN OF ASTRONAUTS, AND THE RETURN OF




Noting the great importance of the Treaty on Principles Governing the Activities
of States in the Exploration and Use of Outer Space, including the Moon and
Other Celestial Bodies, which calls for the rendering of all possible assistance to
astronauts in the event of accident, distress or emergency landing, the prompt
and safe return of astronauts, and the return of objects launched into outer
space,
Desiring to develop and give further concrete expression to these duties.
Wishing to promote international co-operation in the peaceful exploration and
use of outer space,
Prompted by sentiments of humanity,
Have agreed on the following:
Article 1
Each Contracting Party which receives information or discovers that the person-
nel of a spacecraft have suffered accident or are experiencing conditions of
distress or have made an emergency or unintended landing in territory under its
jurisdiction or on the high seas or in any other place not under the jurisdiction of
any State shall immediately:
(a) Notify the launching authority or, if it cannot identify and immediately com-
municate with the launching authority, immediately make a public announce-
ment by all appropriate means of communication at its disposal;
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(b) Notify the Secretary-General of the United Nations, who should disseminate
the information without delay by all appropriate means of communication at his
disposal.
Article 2
If, owing to accident, distress, emergency or unintended landing, the personnel
of a spacecraft land in territory under the jurisdiction of a Contracting Party, it
shall immediately take all possible steps to rescue them and render them all
necessary assistance. It shall inform the launching authority and also the Secre-
tary-General of the United Nations of the steps it is taking and of their progress.
If assistance by the launching authority would help to effect a prompt rescue or
would contribute substantially to the effectiveness of search and rescue opera-
tions, the launching authority shall co-operate with the Contracting Party with a
view to i he effective conduct of search and rescue operations. Such operations
shall be subject to the direction and control of the Contracting Party, which shall
act in close and continuing consultation with the launching authority.
Article 3
If information is received or it is discovered that the personnel of a spacecraft
have alighted on the high seas or in any other place not under the jurisdiction of
any State, those Contracting Parties which are in a position to do so shall, if
necessary, extend assistance in search and rescue operations for such personnel
to assure their speedy rescue. They shall inform the launching authority and the
Secretary-General of the United Nations of the steps they are taking and of their
progress.
Article 4
If, owing to accident, distress, emergency, or unintended landing, the personnel
of a spacecraft land in territory under the jurisdiction of a Contracting Party or
have been found on the high seas or in any other place not under the jurisdiction





Each Contracting Party, which receives information or discovers that a space
object or its component parts has returned to Earth in territory under its juris-
diction or on the high seas or in any other place not under the jurisdiction of any
State, shall notify the launching authority and the Secretary-General of the
United Nations.
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2. Each Contracting Party having jurisdiction over the territory on which a
space object or its component parts has been discovered shall, upon the request
of the launching authority and with assistance from that authority if requested,
take such steps as it finds practicable to recover the object or component parts.
3. Upon request of the launching authority, objects launched into outer space or
their component parts found beyond the territorial limits of the launching
authority shall be returned to or held at the disposal of representatives of the
launching authority, which shall, upon request, furnish identifying data prior to
their return.
4. Notwithstanding paragraphs 2 and 3 of this article, a Contracting Party
which has reason to believe that a space object or its component parts discovered
in territory under its jurisdiction, or recovered by it elsewhere, is of a hazardous
or deleterious nature may so notify the launching authority, which shall imme-
diately take effective steps, under the direction and control of the said Contract-
ing Party, to eliminate possible danger of harm.
5. Expenses incurred in fulfilling obligations to recover and return a space ob-
ject or its component parts under paragraphs 2 and 3 of this article shall be
borne by the launching authority.
Article 6
hor the purposes of this Agreement, the term "launching authority" shall refer to
the State responsible for launching, or where an international inter-governmen-
tal organization is responsible for launching, that organization, provided that
that organization declares its acceptance of the rights and obligations provided
for in this Agreement and a majority of the States members of that organization
are Contracting Parties to this agreement and to the Treaty on Principles Gov-
erning the Activities of States in the Exploration and Use of Outer Space, includ-
ing the Moon and Other Celestial Bodies.
Article 7
1. This Agreement shall be open to all States for signature. Any State which
does not sign this Agreement before its entry into force in accordance with
paragraph 3 of this article may accede to it at any time.
2. This Agreement shall be subject to ratification by signatory States. Instru-
ments of ratification and instruments of accession shall be deposited with the
Governments of the United States of America, the United Kingdom o\' Great
Britain and Northern Ireland and the Union of Soviet Socialist Republics, which
are hereby designated the Depositary Governments.
95
3. This Agreement shall enter into force upon the deposit of instruments of
ratification by five Governments including the Governments designated as
Depositary Governments under this Agreement.
4. For States whose instruments of ratification or accession are deposited subse-
quent to the entry into force of this Agreement, it shall enter into force on the
date of the deposit of their instruments of ratification or accession.
5. The Depositary Governments shall promptly inform all signatory and acced-
ing States of the date of each signature, the date of deposit of each instrument of
ratification of and accession to this Agreement, the date of its entry into force
and other notices.
6. This Agreement shall be registered by the Depositary Governments pursuant
to Article 102 of the Charter of the United Nations.
Article 8
Any State Party to the Agreement may propose amendments to this Agreement.
Amendments shall enter into force for each State Party to the Agreement accept-
ing the amendments upon their acceptance by a majority of the States Parties to
the Agreement and thereafter for each remaining State Party to the Agreement
on the date of acceptance by it.
Article 9
Any State Party to the Agreement may give notice of its withdrawal from the
Agreement one year after its entry into force by written notification to the
Depositary Governments. Such withdrawal shall take effect one year from the
date of receipt of this notification.
Article 10
This Agreement, of which the English, Russian, French, Spanish and Chinese
texts are equally authentic, shall be deposited in the archives o\' the Depositary
Governments. Duly certified copies of this Agreement shall be transmitted by the
Depositary Governments to the Governments of the signatory and acceding
States.
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APPENDIX D. CONVENTION ON INTERNATIONAL
LIABILITY FOR DAMAGE CAUSED BY SPACE OBJECTS
(LIABILITY CONVENTION)
March 29, 1972
The States Parties to this Convention,
Recognizing the common interest of all mankind in furthering the exploration
and use of outer space for peaceful purposes,
Recalling the Treaty on Principles Governing the Activities of States in the Ex-
ploration and Use of Outer Space, including the Moon and Other Celestial
Bodies,
Taking into consideration that, notwithstanding the precautionary measures to
be taken by States and international intergovernmental organizations involved in
the launching of space objects, damage may on occasion be caused by such
objects,
Recognizing the need to elaborate effective international rules and procedures
concerning liability for damage caused by space objects and to ensure, in partic-
ular, the prompt payment under the terms of this Convention of a full and
equitable measure of compensation to victims of such damage,
Believing that the establishment of such rules and procedures will contribute to
the strengthening of international cooperation in the field of the exploration and
use of outer space for peaceful purposes,
Have agreed on the following:
Article I
I -'or the purposes of this Convention:
(a) The term "damage" means loss of life, personal injury or other impairment ol
health; or loss of or damage to property of States or of persons, natural or
juridical, or property of international intergovernmental organizations;
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(b) The term "launching" includes attempted launching;
(c) The term "launching State" means:
(i) A State which launches or procures the launching of a space object;
(ii) A State from whose territory or facility a space object is launched;
(d) The term "space object" includes component parts of a space object as well as
its launch vehicle and parts thereof.
Article II
A launching State shall be absolutely liable to pay compensation for damage
caused by its space object on the surface o( the earth or to aircraft in flight.
Article III
In the event of damage being caused elsewhere than on the surface of the earth to
a space object of one launching State or to persons or property on board such a
space object by a space object of another launching State, the latter shall be
liable only if the damage is due to its fault or the fault of persons for whom it is
responsible.
Article IV
1. In the event of damage being caused elsewhere than on the surface of the
earth to a space object of one launching State or to persons or property on board
such a space object by a space object of another launching state, and of damage
thereby being caused to a third State or to its natural or juridical persons, the
first two States shall be jointly and severally liable to the third State, to the
extent indicated by the following:
(a) If the damage has been caused to the third State on the surface of the
earth or to aircraft in flight, their liability to the third State shall be absolute;
(b) If the damage has been caused to a space object of the third State or to
persons or property on board that space object elsewhere than on the surface
of the earth, their liability to the third State shall be based on the fault of
either of the first two States or on the fault of persons for whom either is
responsible.
2. In all cases o\~ joint and several liability referred to in paragraph 1 of this
article, the burden of compensation for the damage shall be apportioned be-
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tween the first two States in accordance with the extent to which they were at
fault; if the extent of the fault of each of these States cannot be established, the
burden of compensation shall be apportioned equally between them. Such ap-
portionment shall be without prejudice to the right of the third State to seek the
entire compensation due under this Convention from any or all of the launching
States which are jointly and severally liable.
Article V
1. Whenever two or more States jointly launch a space object, they shall be
jointly and severally liable for any damage caused.
2. A launching State which has paid compensation for damage shall have the
right to present a claim for indemnification to other participants in the joint
launching. The participants in a joint launching may conclude agreements re-
garding the apportioning among themselves of the financial obligation in respect
of which they are jointly and severally liable. Such agreements shall be without
prejudice to the right of a State sustaining damage to seek the entire compensa-
tion due under this Convention from any or all of the launching States which are
jointly and severally liable.
3. A State from whose territory or facility a space object is launched shall be
regarded as a participant in a joint launching.
Article VI
1. Subject to the provisions of paragraph 2 of this article, exoneration from
absolute liability shall be granted to the extent that a launching State establishes
that the damage has resulted either wholly or partially from gross negligence or
from an act or omission done with intent to cause damage on the part of a
claimant State or of natural or juridical persons it represents.
2. No exoneration whatever shall be granted in cases where the damage has
resulted from activities conducted by a launching State which are not in con-
formity with international law including, in particular, the Charter of the United
Nations and the Treaty of Principles Governing the Activities of States in the
Exploration and Use of Outer Space, including the Moon and Other Celestial
Bodies.
Article VII
The provisions of this Convention shall not apply to damage caused by a space
object of a launching State to:
(a) Nationals of that launching State;
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(b) Foreign nationals during such time as they are participating in the operation
of that space object from the time of its launching or at any stage thereafter until
its descent, or during such time as they are in the immediate vicinity of a planned
launching or recovery area as the result of an invitation by that launching State.
Article VIII
1. A State which suffers damage, or whose natural or juridical persons suffer
damage, may present to a launching State a claim for compensation for such
damage.
2. If the State of nationality has not presented a claim, another State may, in
respect of damage sustained in its territory by any natural or juridical person,
present a claim to a launching State.
3. If neither the State of nationality nor the State in whose territory the damage
was sustained has presented a claim or notified its intention of presenting a
claim, another State may, in respect of damage sustained by its permanent resi-
dents, present a claim to a launching State.
Article IX
A claim for compensation for damage shall be presented to a launching State
through diplomatic channels. If a State does not maintain diplomatic relations
with the launching State concerned, it may request another State to present its
claim to that launching State or otherwise represent its interests under this Con-
vention. It may also present its claim through the Secretary-General of the
United Nations, provided the claimant State and the launching State are both
Members of the United Nations.
Article X
1. A claim for compensation for damage may be presented to a launching State
not later than one year following the date of the occurrence of the damage or the
identification of the launching State which is liable.
2. If, however, a State does not know of the occurrence of the damage or has
not been able to identify the launching State which is liable, it may present a
claim within one year following the date on which it learned of the aforemen-
tioned facts; however, this period shall in no event exceed one year following the
date on which the State could reasonably be expected to have learned of the facts
through the exercise of due diligence.
}. The time-limits specified in paragraphs 1 and 2 of this article shall apply even
it the full extent ol the damaue may not be known. In this event, however, the
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claimant State shall be entitled to revise the claim and submit additional docu-
mentation after the expiration of such time-limits until one year after the full
extent of the damage is known.
Article XI
1. Presentation of a claim to a launching State for compensation for damage
under this Convention shall not require the prior exhaustion of any local reme-
dies which may be available to a claimant State or to natural or juridical persons
it represents.
2. Nothing in this Convention shall prevent a State, or natural or juridical
persons it might represent, from pursuing a claim in the courts or administrative
tribunals or agencies of a launching State. A State shall not, however, be entitled
to present a claim under this Convention in respect of the same damage for
which a claim is being pursued in the courts or administrative tribunals or agen-
cies of a launching State or under another international agreement which is
binding on the States concerned.
Article XII
The compensation which the launching State shall be liable to pay for damage
under this Convention shall be determined in accordance with international law
and the principles of justice and equity, in order to provide such reparation in
respect of the damage as will restore the person, natural or juridical, State or
international organization on whose behalf the claim is presented to the condi-
tion which would have existed if the damage had not occurred.
Article XIII
Unless the claimant State and the State from which compensation is due under
this Convention agree on another form of compensation, the compensation shall
be paid in the currency of the claimant State or, if that State so requests, in the
currency of the State from which compensation is due.
Article XIV
If no settlement of a claim is arrived at through diplomatic negotiations as
provided for in article IX, within one year from the date on which the claimant
State notifies the launching State that it has submitted the documentation of its






The Claims Commission shall be composed of three members: one appointed
by the claimant State, one appointed by the launching State and the third mem-
ber, the Chairman, to be chosen by both parties jointly. Each party shall make its
appointment within two months of the request for the establishment of the
Claims Commission.
2. I f no agreement is reached on the choice oi~ the Chairman within lour months
of the request for the establishment of the Commission, either party may request
the Secretary-General of the United Nations to appoint the Chairman within a
further period of two months.
Article XVI
1. If one of the parties does not make its appointment within the stipulated
period, the Chairman shall, at the request of the other Party, constitute a single-
member Claims Commission.
2. Any vacancy which may arise in the Commission for whatever reason shall be
filled by the same procedure adopted for the original appointment.
3. The Commission shall determine its own procedure.
4. The Commission shall determine the place or places where it shall sit and all
other administrative matters.
5. Except in the case of decisions and awards by a single-member Commission,
all decisions and awards of the Commission shall be by majority vote.
Article XVII
No increase in the membership of the Claims Commission shall take place by
reason of two or more claimant States or launching States being joined in any
one proceeding before the Commission. The claimant States so joined shall
collectively appoint one member of the Commission in the same manner and
subject to the same conditions as would be the case for a single claimant State.
When two or more launching States are so joined, they shall collectively appoint
one member of the Commission in the same way. If the claimant States or the
launching States do not make the appointment within the stipulated period, the
Chairman shall constitute a single-member Commission.
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Article XVIII
The Claims Commission shall decide the merits of the claim for compensation




The Claims Commission shall act in accordance with the provisions of article
XII.
2. T he decision of the Commission shall be final and binding if the Parties have
so agreed; otherwise the Commission shall render a final and recommendatory
award, which the parties shall consider in good faith. The Commission shall
stale the reasons for its decision or award.
3. I Ik ( ommission shall give its decision or award as promptly as possible and
in) laid lhan one year from the date of its establishment, unless an extension of
this period is found necessary by the Commission.
4. The Commission shall make its decision or award public. It shall deliver a
certified copy of its decision or award to each of the parties and to the Secretary-
General of the United Nations.
Article XX
The expenses in regard to the Claims Commission shall be borne equally by the
parties, unless otherwise decided by the Commission.
Article XXI
If the damage caused by a space object presents a large-scale danger to human
life or seriously interferes with the living conditions of the population or the
functioning of vital centers, the States Parties, and in particular the launching
State, shall examine the possibility of rendering appropriate and rapid assistance
to the State which has suffered the damage, when it so requests. However,
nothing in this article shall affect the rights or obligations of the States Parties
under this Convention.
Article XXII
1 . In this Convention, with the exception of articles XXIV to XXVII, references
to Slates shall be deemed to apply to any international intergovernmental organi-
zation which conducts space activities if the organization declares its acceptance
of the rights and obligations provided for in this Convention and if a majority of
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the States members of the organization are States Parties to this Convention and
to the Treaty on Principles Governing the Activities of States in the Exploration
and Use of Outer Space, including the Moon and Other Celestial Bodies.
2. States members of any such organization which arc States Parties to this
Convention shall take all appropriate steps to ensure that the organization makes
a declaration in accordance with the preceding Paragraph.
3. If an international intergovernmental organization is liable lor damage by
virtue of the provisions of this Convention, that organization and (hose of its
members which are States Parties to this Convention shall be jointly and
severally liable; provided, however, that:
(a) Any claim for compensation in respect of such damage shall be first
presented to the organization;
(b) Only where the organization has not paid, within a period of six months,
any sum agreed or determined to be due as compensation for such damage,
may the claimant State invoke the liability of the members which are States
Parties to this Convention for the payment of thai sum.
4. Any claim, pursuant to the provision of this Convention, lor compensation in
respect of damage caused to an organization which has made a declaration in
accordance with paragraph 1 of this article shall be presented by a State member
of the organization which is a State Party to this Convention.
Article XX III
1. The provision of this Convention shall not affect other international agree-
ments in force in so far as relations between the States Parties to such agree-
ments are concerned.
2. No provision of this Convention shall prevent States from concluding inter-
national agreements reaffirming, supplementing or extending its provisions.
Article XXIV
1. This Convention shall be open to all States for signature. Any Slate which
does not sign this Convention before its entry into force in accordance with
paragraph 3 of this article may accede to it any time.
2. This Convention shall be subject to ratification by signatory Stales. Instru-
ments of ratification and instruments of accession shall be deposited with the
Governments of the United States of America, ihe United Kingdom of Great
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Britain and Northern Ireland and the Union of Soviet Socialist Republics, which
are hereby designated the Depositary Governments.
3. This Convention shall enter into force on the deposit o\' the fifth instrument
o\' ratification.
4. For States whose instruments of ratification or accession are deposited subse-
quent to the entry into force of this Convention, it shall enter into force on the
date of the deposit of their instruments of ratification or accession.
5. The Depositary Governments shall promptly inform all signatory and acced-
ing States of the date of each signature, the date of deposit of each instrument of
ratification of and accession to this Convention, the date o\' its entry into force
and other notices.
6. This Convention shall be registered by the Depositary Governments pursuant
to Article 102 of the Charter of the United Nations.
Article XXV
Any State Party to this Convention may propose amendments to this conven-
tion. Amendments shall enter into force for each State Party to the Convention
accepting the amendments upon their acceptance by a majority of the States
Parties to the Convention and thereafter for each remaining State Part\ to the
Convention on the date of acceptance by it.
Article XXVI
Ten years after the entry into force of this Convention, the question o\' the review
of this Convention shall be included in the provisional agenda of the United
Nations General Assembly in order to consider, in the light of past application of
the Convention, whether it requires revision. However, at any time after the
Convention has been in force for five years, and at the request of one third of
the States Parties to the Convention, and with the concurrence of the majority of
the States Parties, a conference of the States Parties shall be convened to review
this Convention.
Article XXVII
Any State Party to this Convention may give notice of its withdrawal from the
Convention one year after its entry into force by written notification to the
Depositary Governments. Such withdrawal shall take elTect one year from the
date of receipt of this notification.
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Article XXVIII
This Convention, of which the English, Russian, French, Spanish and Chinese
texts arc equally authentic, shall be deposited in- the archives of the Depositary
Governments. Duly certified copies of this Convention shall be transmitted by
the Depositary Governments to the Governments of the signatory and acceding
States.
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APPENDIX E. CONVENTION ON REGISTRATION OF
OBJECTS LAUNCHED INTO OUTER SPACE (REGISTRATION
CONVENTION)
January 14, 1975
The Stales Parties to this Convention,
Recognizing the common interest of all mankind in furthering the explora-
tion and use of outer space for peaceful purposes,
Recalling that the Treaty of Principles Governing the Activities o\~ States in
the Exploration and Use of Outer Space, including the Moon and Other Celestial
Bodies of 27 January 1967 affirms that States shall bear international responsi-
bility for their national activities in outer space and refers to the State on whose
registry an object launched into outer space is carried.
Recalling also that the Agreement on the Rescue of Astronauts, the Return
of Astronauts and the Return of Objects Launched into Outer Space of 22 April
1968 provides that a launching authority shall, upon request, furnish identifying
data prior to the return of an object it has launched into outer space found
beyond the territorial limits of the launching authority.
Recalling further that the Convention on International Liability for Dam-
age Caused by Space Objects of 29 March 1972 establishes international rules
and procedures concerning the liability of launching States for damage caused by
their space objects.
Desiring, in the light of the Treaty on Principles Governing the Activities of
States in the Exploration and Use of Outer Space, Including the Moon and
Other Celestial Bodies, to make provision for the national registration by
launching Slates of space objects launched into outer space.
Desiring further that a central register of objects launched into outer space
be established and maintained, on a mandatory basis, by the Secretary-General
of the United Nations.
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Desiring also to provide for States Parties additional means and procedures
to assist in the identification of space objects.
Believing that a mandatory system of registering objects launched into
outer space would, in particular, assist in their identification and would contrib-
ute to the application and development of international law governing the ex-
ploration and use of outer space,
Have agreed on the following:
Article I
For the purposes of this Convention:
(a) The term "launching State" means:
(i) A State which launches or procures the launching of a space object;
(ii) A State from whose territory or facility a space object is launched;
(b) The term "space object" includes component parts of a space object as well as
its launch vehicle and parts thereof;
(c) The term "State of registry" means a launching State of whose registry a
space object is carried in accordance with article II.
Article II
1. When a space object is launched into earth orbit or beyond, the launching
State shall register the space object by means of an entry in an appropriate
registry which it shall maintain. Each launching State shall inform the Secretary-
General of the United Nations of the establishment of such a registry.
2. Where there are two or more launching States in respect of any such space
object, they shall jointly determine which one of them shall register the object in
accordance with paragraph 1 of this article, bearing in mind the provisions of
article VIII of the Treaty on Principles Governing the Activities of States in the
Exploration and Use of Outer Space, Including the Moon and Other Celestial
Bodies, and without prejudice to appropriate agreements concluded or to be
concluded among the launching States on jurisdiction and control over the space
object and over any personnel thereof.
3. The contents of each registry and the conditions under which it is maintained
shall be determined by the State of registry concerned.
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Article III
1. The Secretary-General o\~ the United Nations shall maintain a Register in
which the information furnished in accordance with article IV shall be recorded.
2. There shall be full and open access to the information in this Register.
Article IV
1. Each State of registry shall furnish to the Secretary-General of the United
Nations, as soon as practicable, the following information concerning each
space object carried on its registry:
(a) Name of launching State or States;
(b) An appropriate designator of the space object or its registration number;
(c) Date and territory or location of launch;





(e) General function o\~ the space object.
2. Each State of registry may, from time to time, provide the Secretary-General
of the United Nations with additional information concerning a space object
carried on its registry.
3. Each State of registry shall notify the Secretary-General of the United Na-
tions, to the greatest extent feasible and as soon as practicable, of space objects
concerning which it has previously transmitted information, and which have
been but no longer are in earth orbit.
Article V
Whenever a space object launched into earth orbit or beyond is marked with the
designator or registration number referred to in article IV, paragraph 1 (h), or
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both, the State of registry shall notify the Secretary-General of this fact when
submitting the information regarding the space object in accordance with article
IV. In such case, the Secretary-General of the United Nations shall record this
notification in the Register.
Article VI
Where the application of the provisions of this Convention has not enabled a
State Party to identify a space object which has caused damage to it or to any of
its natural or juridical persons, or which may be of a hazardous or deleterious
nature, other States Parties, including in particular States possessing space moni-
toring and tracking facilities, shall respond to the greatest extent feasible to a
request by that State Party, or transmitted through the Secretary-General on its
behalf, for assistance under equitable and reasonable conditions in the identifi-
cation of the object. A State Party making such a request shall, to the greatest
extent feasible, submit information as to the time, nature and circumstances of
the events giving rise to the request. Arrangements under which such assistance





In this Convention, with the exception of articles VIII to XII inclusive, refer-
ences to States shall be deemed to apply to any international intergovernmental
organization which conducts space activities if the organization declares its
acceptance of the rights and obligations provided for in this Convention and if a
majority of the States members of the organization are States Parties to this
Convention and to the Treaty on Principles Governing the Activities of States in
the Exploration and Use of Outer Space, Including the Moon and Other Celes-
tial Bodies.
2. States members of any such organization which are States Parties to this
Convention shall take all appropriate steps to ensure that the organization makes
a declaration in accordance with paragraph 1 of this article.
Article VIII
1. This Convention shall be open for signature by all States at United Nations
Headquarters in New York. Any State which does not sign this Convention
before its entry into force in accordance with paragraph 3 of this article may
accede to it at any time.
2. This Convention shall be subject to ratification by signatorv States. Instru-
ments of ratification and instruments of accession shall be deposited with the
Secretary-General of the United Nations.
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3. This Convention shall enter into force among the States which have deposited
instruments of ratification on the deposit of the fifth such instrument with the
Secretary-General of the United Nations.
4. For States whose instruments of ratification or accession are deposited subse-
quent to the entry into force of the Convention, it shall enter into force on the
date of the deposit of their instruments of ratification or accession.
5. The Secretary-General shall promptly inform all signatory and acceding
States of the date of each signature, the date of deposit of each instrument of
ratification of and accession to this Convention, the date of its entry into force
and other notices.
Article IX
Any State Party to this Convention may propose amendments to the Conven-
tion. Amendments shall enter into force for each State Party to the Convention
accepting the amendments upon their acceptance by a majority of the States
Parties to the Convention and thereafter for each remaining State Party to the
Convention on the date of acceptance by it.
Article X
Ten years after the entry into force of this Convention, the question of the review
of the Convention shall be included in the provisional agenda of the United
Nations General Assembly in order to consider, in the light of past application of
the Convention, whether it requires revision. However, at any time after the
Convention has been in force for five years, at the request of one third of the
States Parties to the Convention and with the concurrence of the majority of the
States Parties, a conference of the States Parties shall be convened to review this
Convention. Such review shall take into account in particular any relevant tech-
nological developments, including those relating to the identification of space
objects.
Article XI
Any State Party to this Convention may give notice of its withdrawal from the
Convention one year after its entry into force by written notification to the
Secretary-General of the United Nations. Such withdrawal shall take effect one
year from the date of receipt of this notification.
Article XII
The original of this Convention, of which the Arabic, Chinese, English, French,
Russian and Spanish texts are equally authentic, shall be deposited with the
Secretary-General of the United States, who shall send certified copies thereof to
all signatory and acceding States.
I I
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APPENDIX F. THE 1972 ANTI-BALLISTIC TREATY (ABM
TREATY), AGREED INTERPRETATIONS AND UNILATERAL
STATEMENTS REGARDING THE ABM TREATY
The United States of America and the Union of Soviet
Socialist Republics, hereinafter referred to as the Parties,
Proceeding from the premise that nuclear war would have devastat-
ing consequences for all mankind,
Considering that effective measures to limit anti-ballistic missile sys-
tems would be a substantial factor in curbing the race in strategic offensive
arms and would lead to a decrease in the risk of outbreak of war involving
nuclear weapons,
Proceeding from the premise that the limitation of anti-ballistic mis-
sile systems, as well as certain agreed measures with respect to the limita-
tion of strategic offensive arms, would contribute to the creation of more
favorable conditions for further negotiations on limiting strategic arms,
Mindful of their obligations under Article VI of the Treaty on the
Non-Proliferation of Nuclear Weapons,
Declaring their intention to achieve at the earliest possible date the
cessation of the nuclear arms race and to take effective measures toward
reductions in strategic arms, nuclear disarmament, and general and com-
plete disarmament,
Desiring to contribute to the relaxation of international tension and
the strengthening of trust between States,
Have agreed as follows:
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ARTICLE I
1. Each Party undertakes to limit anti-ballistic missile (ABM) sys-
tems and to adopt other measures in accordance with the provisions of the
Treaty.
2. Each Party undertakes not to deploy ABM systems for a defense
of the territory of its country and not to provide a base for such a defense,
and not to deploy ABM systems for defense of an individual region except
as provided for in Article III of this Treaty.
ARTICLE II
1. For the purpose of this Treaty an ABM system is a system to
counter strategic ballistic missiles or their elements in flight trajectory,
currently consisting of:
(a) ABM interceptor missiles, which are interceptor missiles con-
structed and deployed for an ABM role, or of a type tested in an ABM
mode;
(b) ABM launchers, which are launchers constructed and deployed
for launching ABM interceptor missiles; and
(c) ABM radars, which are radars constructed and deployed for an
ABM role, or of a type tested in an ABM mode.
2. The ABM system components listed in paragraph 1 of this Article




(d) undergoing overhaul, repair or conversion; or
(e) mothballed.
ARTICLE III
Each Party undertakes not to deploy ABM systems or their compo-
nents except that:
(a) within one ABM systems deployment area having a radius of one
hundred and fifty kilometers and centered on the Party's national capital,
a Party may deploy: (1) no more than one hundred ABM launchers and
no more than one hundred ABM interceptor missiles at launch sites, and
(2) ABM radars within no more than six ABM radar complexes, the area
of each complex being circular and having a diameter of no more than
three kilometers; and
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(b) within one ABM system deployment area having a radius of one
hundred and fifty kilometers and containing ICBM silo launchers, a Party
may deploy: (1) no more than one hundred ABM radars and no more than
one hundred ABM interceptors at launch sites, (2) two large phased-array
ABM radars comparable in potential to corresponding ABM radars
operational or under construction on the date of signature of the Treaty in
an ABM system deployment area containing ICBM silo launchers, and (3)
no more than eighteen ABM radars each having a potential less than the
potential of the smaller of the above-mentioned two large phased-array
radars.
ARTICLE IV
The limitations provided for in Article III shall not apply to ABM
systems or their components used for development or testing, and located
within current or additionally agreed test ranges. Each Party may have no
more than a total of fifteen ABM launchers at test ranges.
ARTICLE V
1. Each Party undertakes not to develop, test, or deploy ABM sys-
tems or components which are sea-based, air-based, space-based, or mo-
bile land-based.
2. Each Party undertakes not to develop, test, or deploy ABM
launchers for launching more than one ABM interceptor missile at a time
from each launcher, nor to modify deployed launchers to provide them
with such a capability, nor to test, or deploy automatic or semi-automatic
or other similar systems for rapid reload of ABM launchers.
ARTICLE VI
To enhance assurance of the effectiveness of the limitations on ABM
systems and their components provided by this Treaty, each Party under-
takes:
(a) not to give missiles, launchers, or radars, other than ABM inter-
ceptor missiles, ABM launchers, or ABM radars, capabilities to counter
strategic ballistic missiles or their elements in flight trajectory, and not to
test them in an ABM mode; and
(b) not to deploy in the future radars for early warning of strategic
ballistic missile attack except at locations along the periphery of its na-
tional territory and oriented outward.
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ARTICLE VII
Subject to the provisions of this treaty, modernization and replace-
ment of ABM systems or their components may be carried out.
ARTICLE VIII
ABM systems or their components in excess of the numbers or out-
side the areas specified in the Treaty, as well as ABM systems or their
components prohibited by this Treaty, shall be destroyed or dismantled
under agreed procedures within the shortest possible agreed period of
time.
ARTICLE IX
To assure the viability and effectiveness of the Treaty, each Party
undertakes not to transfer to other States, and not to deploy outside
national territory, ABM systems or their components limited by this
Treaty.
ARTICLE X
Each Party undertakes not to assume any international obligation
which would conflict with this Treaty.
ARTICLE XI
The Parties undertake to continue active negotiations for limitations
on strategic offensive arms.
ARTICLE XII
1. For the purpose of providing assurance of compliance with the
provisions of this Treaty, each Party shall use national technical means of
verification at its disposal in a manner consistent with generally recog-
nized principles of international law.
2. Each Party undertakes not to interfere with the national technical
means of verification of the other Party operating in accordance with
Paragraph 1 of the Article.
3. Each Party undertakes not to use deliberate concealment measures
which impede verification by national technical means of compliance with
the provisions of this Treaty. This obligation shall not require changes in
current construction, assembly, conversion, or overhaul practices.
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ARTICLE XIII
1. To promote the objectives and implementation of the provisions
of this Treaty, the Parties shall establish promptly a Standing Consultative
Commission, within the framework of which they will:
(a) consider questions concerning compliance with the obligations
assumed and related situations which may be considered ambiguous;
(b) provide on a voluntary basis such information as either Party
considers necessary to assure confidence in compliance with the obliga-
tions assumed;
(c) consider questions involving unintended interference with na-
tional technical means of verification;
(d) consider possible changes in the strategic situation which have a
bearing on the provisions of the Treaty;
(e) agree upon procedures and dates for destruction or dismantling
of ABM systems or their components in cases provided for by the provi-
sions of this treaty;
(f) consider, as appropriate, possible proposals for further increasing
the viability of this Treaty, including proposals for amendments in accord-
ance with the provisions of the Treaty;
(g) consider, as appropriate, proposals for further measures aimed at
limiting strategic arms.
2. The Parties through consultation shall establish and may amend
as appropriate, Regulations for the Standing Consultative Commission
governing procedures, composition and other relevant matters.
ARTICLE XIV
1. Each Party may propose amendments to this Treaty. Agreed
amendments shall enter into force in accordance with the procedures gov-
erning the entry into force of this Treaty.
2. Five years after entry into force of this Treaty, and at five-year
intervals thereafter, the Parties shall together conduct a review of the
Treaty.
ARTICLE XV
1. This Treaty shall be of unlimited duration.
2. Each Party shall, in exercising its national sovereignty, have the
right to withdraw from this Treaty if it decides that extraordinary event
related to the subject matter of this Treaty have jeopardized its supreme
interests. It shall give notice of its decision to the other Party prior to
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withdrawal from the Treaty. Such notice shall include a statement of the





This Treaty shall be subject to ratification in accordance with the
constitutional procedures of each Party. The Treaty shall enter into force
on the day of the exchange of instruments of ratification.
2. This Treaty shall be registered pursuant to Article 102 of the Char-
ter of the United Nations.
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1 . Agreed Statements
The document set forth below was agreed upon and initialed by the
Heads of the Delegations on May 26, 1972:
[A]
The Parties understand that, in addition to the ABM radars which
may be deployed in accordance with subparagraph (a) of Article III of the
Treaty, those non-phased-array ABM radars operational on the date of
signature of the Treaty within the ABM system deployment area for de-
fense of the national capital may be retained.
[B]
The Parties understand that the potential (the product of mean emit-
ted power in watts and antenna area in square meters) of the smaller of the
two large phased-array ABM radars referred to in subparagraph (b) of
Article III of the Treaty is considered for purposes of the Treaty to be
three million.
[C]
The Parties understand that the center of the ABM system deploy-
ment area centered on the national capital and the center of the ABM
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system deployment area containing ICBM silo launchers for each Party
shall be separated by no less than thirteen hundred kilometers.
[D]
In order to ensure fulfillment of the obligation not to deploy ABM
systems and their components except as provided in Article III of the
Treaty, the Parties agree that in the event ABM systems based on other
physical principles and including components capable of substituting for
ABM interceptors missiles, ABM launchers, or ABM radars are created in
the future, specific limitations on such systems and their components
would be subject to discussion in accordance with Article XIII and agree-
ment in accordance with Article XIV of the Treaty.
[E]
The Parties understand that Article V of the Treaty includes obliga-
tions not to develop, test, or deploy ABM interceptor missile for the
delivery by each ABM interceptor missile of more than one independently
guided warhead.
[F]
The Parties agree not to deploy phased-array radars having a poten-
tial (the product of mean emitted power in watts and antenna area in
square meters) exceeding three million, except as provided for in Article
III, IV and VI of the Treaty, or except for the purposes of tracking objects
in outer space or for use as national technical means of verification.
[G]
The Parties understand that Article IX of the Treaty includes the
obligation of the US and the USSR not to provide to other States technical
descriptions or blue prints specially worked out for the construction of
ABM systems and their components limited by the Treaty.
2. Common Understandings
Common understanding of the Parties on the following matter was
reached during the negotiations:
A. Location of ICBM Defenses
The US Delegation made the following statement on May 26, 1972:
Article III of the ABM Treaty provides for each side on ABM system
deployment area centered on its national capital and one ABM system
deployment area containing ICBM silo launchers. The two sides have
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registered agreement on the following statement: "The Parties understand
that the center of the ABM system deployment area centered on the na-
tional capital and the center of the ABM system deployment area contain-
ing ICBM silo launchers for each Party shall be separated by no less than
thirteen hundred kilometers." In this connection, the US side notes that its
ABM system deployment area for defense of ICBM silo launchers, located
west of the Mississippi River, will be centered in the Grand Forks ICBM
silo launcher deployment area. (See Initialed Statement [C].)
B. ABM Test Ranges
The US Delegation made the following statement on April 26, 1972:
Article IV of the ABM Treaty provides that "the limitations provided
for in Article III shall not apply to ABM systems or their components
used for development of testing, and located within current or addi-
tionally agreed test ranges." We believe it would be useful to assure that
there is no misunderstanding as to current ABM test ranges. It is our
understanding that ABM test ranges encompass the area within which
ABM components are located for test purposes. The current US ABM test
ranges are at White Sands, New Mexico, and at Kwajalein Atoll, and the
current Soviet ABM test range is near Sary Shagan in Kazakhstan. We
consider that non-phased array radars of types used for range safety or
instrumentation purposes may be located outside of ABM test ranges. We
interpret the reference in Article IV to "additionally agreed test ranges" to
mean that ABM components will not be located at any other test ranges
without prior agreement between our Governments that there will be such
additional ABM test ranges.
On May 5, 1972, the Soviet Delegation stated that there was a com-
mon understanding on what ABM test ranges were, that the use of the
types of non-ABM radars for range safety or instrumentation was not
limited under the Treaty, that the reference in Article IV to "additionally
agreed" test ranges was sufficiently clear, and that national means permit-
ted identifying current test ranges.
C. Mobile ABM Systems
On January 28, 1972, the US Delegation made the following state-
ment:
Article V (I) of the Joint Draft Text of the ABM Treaty includes an
undertaking not to develop, test, or deploy mobile land-based ABM sys-
tems and their components. On May 5, 1971, the US side indicated that,
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in its view, a prohibition on deployment of mobile ABM systems and their
components would rule out the deployment of ABM launchers and radars
which were not permanent fixed types. At that time, we asked for the
Soviet view of this interpretation. Does the Soviet side agree with the US
side's interpretation put forward on May 5, 1971?
On April 13, 1972, the Soviet Delegation said there is a general com-
mon understanding of this matter.
D. Standing Consultative Commission
Ambassador Smith made the following statement on May 22, 1972:
The United States proposes that the sides agree that, with regard to
initial implementation of the ABM Treaty's Article XIII on the Standing
Consultative Commission (SCC) and of the consultation Articles to the
Accidents Agreement, agreement establishing the SCC will be worked out
early in the follow-on SALT negotiations; until that is completed, the
following arrangements will prevail: when SALT is in session, any consul-
tation desired by either side under these Articles be carried out by the two
SALT Delegations; when SALT is not in session, ad hoc arrangements for
any desired consultations under these Articles may be made through diplo-
matic channels.
Minister Semenov replied that, on an ad referendum basis, he could
agree that the US statement corresponded to the Soviet understanding.
E. Standstill
On May 6, 1972, Minister Semenov made the following statement:
In an effort to accommodate the wishes of the US side, the Soviet
Delegation is prepared to proceed on the basis that the two sides will in
fact observe the obligations of both the Interim Agreement and the ABM
Treaty beginning from the date of signature of these two documents.
In reply, the US Delegation made the following statement on May 20,
1972:
The US agree in principle with the Soviet statement made on May 6
concerning observance of obligations beginning from date of signature
but we would like to make clear our understanding that this means that,
pending ratification and acceptance, neither side would take any action
prohibited by the agreements after they had entered into force. This un-
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derstanding would continue to apply in the absence of notification by
either signatory of its intention not to proceed with ratification or ap-
proval.
The Soviet Delegation indicated agreement with the US statement.
3. Unilateral Statements
The following noteworthy unilateral statements were made during the
negotiations by the United States Delegation:
A. Withdrawal from the ABM Treaty
On May 9, 1972, Ambassador Smith made the following statement:
The US Delegation has stressed the importance of the US Govern-
ment attaches to achieving agreement on more complete limitations on
strategic offensive arms, following agreement on an ABM Treaty and on
an Interim Agreement on certain measure with respect to the limitations
of strategic offensive arms. The US Delegation believes that an objective
of the follow-on negotiations should be to constrain and reduce on a long-
term basis threats to the survivability of our respective strategic retaliatory
forces. The USSR Delegation has also indicated that the objectives of
SALT would remain unfulfilled without the achievement of an agreement
providing for more complete limitations on strategic offensive arms. Both
sides recognize that the initial agreements would be steps toward the
achievement of more complete limitations on strategic arms. If an agree-
ment providing for more complete strategic offensive arms limitations
were not achieved within five years, US supreme interest could be jeopard-
ized. Should that occur, it would constitute a basis for withdrawal from
the ABM Treaty. The US does not wish to see such a situation occur, nor
do we believe that the USSR does. It is because we wish to prevent such a
situation that we emphasize the importance that the US Government at-
taches to achievement of more complete limitations on strategic offensive
arms. The US Executive will inform the Congress, in connection with
Congressional consideration of the ABM Treaty and the Interim Agree-
ment, of this statement of the US position.
B. Tested in ABM Mode
On April 7, 1972, the US Delegation made the following statement:
Article II of the Joint Text Draft uses the term "tested in an ABM
mode," in defining ABM components, and Article VI includes certain
obligations concerning such testing. We believe that the sides should have
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a common understanding of this phrase. First, we would note that the
testing provisions of the ABM Treaty are intended to apply to testing
which occurs after the date of signature of the Treaty, and not to any
testing which may have occurred in the past. Next, we would amplify the
remarks we have made on this subject during the previous Helsinki phase
by setting forth the objectives which govern the US view on the subject,
namely, while prohibiting testing of non-ABM components for ABM pur-
poses: not to prevent testing of ABM components, and not to prevent
testing of non-ABM components for non-ABM purposes. To clarify our
interpretation of "tested in an ABM mode," we note that we would con-
sider a launcher, missile or radar to be "tested in an ABM mode" if, for
example, any of the following events occur: (1) a launcher is used to
launch an ABM interceptor missile, (2) an interceptor missile is flight
tested against a target vehicle which has a flight trajectory with character-
istics of a strategic ballistic missile flight trajectory or an ABM interceptor
missile or an ABM radar at the same test range, or is flight tested to an
altitude inconsistent with interception of targets against which air defenses
are deployed, (3) a radar makes measurements on a cooperative target
vehicle of the kind referred to in item (2) above during the reentry portion
of its trajectory or makes measurements in conjunction with the test of an
ABM interceptor missile or an ABM radar at the same test range. Radars
used for purposes such as range safety or instrumentation would be ex-
empt from application of the criteria.
C. No-Transfer Article of ABM Treaty
On April 18, 1972, the US Delegation made the following statement:
In regard to this Article [IX], I have a brief and I believe self-explana-
tory statement to make. The US side wishes to make clear that the provi-
sions of this Article do not set a precedent for whatever provision may be
considered for a Treaty on Limiting Strategic Offensive Arms. The ques-
tion of transfer of strategic offensive arms is a far more complex issue,
which may require a different solution.
D. No Increase in Defense of Early Warning Radars
On July 28, 1970, the US Delegation made the following statement:
Since Hen House radars [Soviet ballistic-missile early-warning radars)
can detect and track ballistic missile warheads at great distances, they have
a significant ABM potential. Accordingly, the US would regard any in-
crease in the defenses of such radars by surface-to-air missiles as inconsis-
tent with an agreement.
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